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In our everyday lives, we regularly communicate with people at home, at work, 
at school, or in public places such as shops or restaurants. These interactions can 
elicit positive emotions (e.g., when we receive a compliment) or negative ones 
(e.g., when people criticize us, treat us unfairly or when they violate important 
social norms). People differ in how they respond to such situations. For example, 
when treated unfairly by someone, some people may experience anger because 
it negatively affects their feelings of self-worth (e.g., Koper, Van Knippenberg, 
Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993). They may express this anger and find it 
difficult to forgive the person who offended them. Others, however, may suppress 
this negative feeling and forgive the offender because they want to maintain a 
good relationship with this person. These variations in how people experience, 
appraise and respond to the same situation can - at least in part - be explained by 
their cultural background (e.g., Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006; Matsu-
moto, Takeuchi, Andayani, Kouznetsova, & Krupp, 1998; Mesquita & Ellsworth, 
2001). This dissertation examines cross-cultural differences in how people respond 
to various everyday situations, ranging from the extent to which they regulate 
their emotions in their interactions with others, to their responses to situations in 
which they are being treated unfairly or in which social norms are violated.
One of the most widely used frameworks to understand cross-cultural differ-
ences in how people feel, think and respond when they interact with others is 
perhaps that of individualism-collectivism (for reviews see Kagitcibasi, 1997; Oy-
serman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Individualism involves cultures in which 
ties between individuals are relatively loose and the interests of the individual 
often prevail over the interests of the group (e.g., the United States of America or 
the Netherlands). Collectivism, by contrast, refers to cultures in which people are 
integrated into strong cohesive groups and the interests of the groups generally 
prevail over the interests of the individual (e.g., Indonesia or China) (Triandis, 
1995).
A central tenet of the individualism-collectivism framework (or IC framework) 
is that in cultures that are more individualistic, people view themselves as rela-
tively independent from others (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). 
According to the framework, people in such cultures are encouraged to discover 
and express their unique attributes. Thus, their behaviors should reflect their own 
thoughts and feelings. They are also expected to experience and express emotions 
that are more ego-focused (e.g., anger, frustration, pride) and to prioritize their 
own goals and well-being (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). Con-
versely, people from more collectivistic cultures should have a stronger tendency 
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to view themselves as interdependent or connected with social groups, such as 
their family or community (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis 1995). 
It is generally assumed that they focus on maintaining good relationships with 
others and tend to be sensitive to what others feel, think or expect from them. 
As such, they should experience more other-focused emotions (e.g., sympathy, 
shame) as compared to people from individualistic cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). It has also been argued that this concern for others may trigger them to 
suppress their emotions, because they want to maintain harmonious relationships 
or prevent that others are being hurt (e.g., Chiang, 2012). Thus, compared to 
those from individualistic cultures, people from collectivistic cultures are expected 
to prioritize the well-being of their social group over their own well-being (e.g., 
Triandis, 1995).
By now, a wealth of studies have used the individualism-collectivism distinction 
as a primary framework to explain cross-cultural differences in how people feel, 
think and behave in a variety of situations. Despite the popularity of this frame-
work, however, there has also been much debate among researchers about some 
of its prime assumptions and its usefulness as a universal model (e.g., Schwartz, 
1990; Voronov & Singer, 2002). For example, some researchers have questioned 
the conceptualization of individualism and collectivism as each other’s opposite, 
and have stated that people across cultures can hold both individualistic and 
collectivistic values (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000; Killen & Wainryb, 2000; Neff, 
Brabeck, & Kearney, 2006). In addition, several studies have challenged the idea 
that people who belong to individualistic cultures are by definition more self-
oriented and that those from collectivistic cultures are more other-oriented (e.g., 
Fischer & Schwartz, 2011; Imamoğlu, 1998). For example, in their meta-analysis 
of individualism-collectivism differences, Oyserman and colleagues (2002) found 
that people in the US (who are generally considered to be more individualistic) 
scored higher on feelings of belonging and enjoyment of group membership than 
people in Hong Kong and Japan (who are generally considered to be more col-
lectivistic). In a similar vein, these researchers found that people in Indonesia 
(a country that is considered to be collectivistic) did not score reliably differ-
ent from those in the US on an individualism scale. Furthermore, a large-scale 
cross-national survey conducted by Vignoles and colleagues (2016) revealed 
that - although Western samples (from the US and New Zealand) valued being 
different from others - they also valued commitment to others. Along similar 
lines, these researchers found that Sub-Saharan African samples (e.g., Uganda and 
Namibia) valued being similar to others, but that they also valued putting the 
interest of the self first (e.g., personal success). On the basis of these findings, 







 1as “independent” or “interdependent” in a general sense’ (p. 991). They argue 
that ‘future researchers should seek to identify which forms of independence and 
which forms of interdependence prevail in different contexts, in order to theorize 
and test potential explanations and implications of the patterns that they find’ (p. 
991).
In line with this view, researchers have begun to consider the possibility that 
the extent to which people from individualistic and collectivistic cultures tend 
to focus on the self or on others may depend on the circumstances in which they 
find themselves and on their relationship with those who are present, such as close 
others (e.g., friends) or non-close others (e.g., strangers) (e.g., Coᶊkan, Phalet, 
Güngor, and Mesquita, 2016; English & Chen, 2007; Suh, 2000). For example, 
it is possible that - depending on who the interaction partners are - people from 
collectivistic cultures can be oriented toward the self too, and that those who be-
long to individualistic cultures can be oriented toward others as well. Support for 
this idea comes from a study by Coᶊkan, Phalet, Güngor, and Mesquita (2016), 
in which they asked Belgian (who are considered individualistic) and Turkish 
(who are considered collectivistic) youth to describe themselves in terms of being 
autonomous (and hence more self-oriented) or related (and hence more other-
oriented) in their relationship with their mother (a close other) or their teacher (a 
non-close other). They found that Belgians and Turks differed in how autonomous 
or related they felt with their teachers, but not with their mother. These results 
suggest that differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures may not 
be as clear-cut as is often suggested in cross-cultural research (for a discussion see 
Kağitçibaşi, 2005; Matsumoto, 1999; Tamis-LeMonda et al., 2008).
This dissertation aims to contribute to current discussions on the explanatory 
value of the IC framework, by examining how cross-cultural differences in indi-
vidualistic and collectivistic values are manifested in a variety of social situations. 
More specifically, we are interested in whether, when, and to what extent the 
reactions of people from individualistic cultures and collectivistic cultures in these 
situations are in line with predictions made by the IC framework. For this, we use 
a combination of methods including a daily diary study, an experiment, a scenario 
study and a recall study. Our samples include participants with Dutch, Chinese 
and Indonesian backgrounds. To examine whether cross-cultural differences in 
response to a variety of interactive situations also depends on the societal context 
in which people with collectivistic backgrounds have been raised, we also conduct 
two studies with descendants from Indonesian immigrants (in particular Moluc-
cans) in the Netherlands.
Given that it is generally believed that in collectivistic cultures people are 
encouraged to suppress their feelings more than in individualistic cultures (e.g., 
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Butler, Lee, & Gross, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), we first focus on how 
people with individualistic backgrounds (Dutch) and collectivistic backgrounds 
(Chinese, Indonesian) regulate their emotions in their everyday interactions. We 
will also assess whether this depends on who the other person is: a close other 
or a non-close other. We then move on to examine the emotional responses of 
people from individualistic cultures and collectivistic cultures when they are 
treated unfairly by others. Given that people from individualistic cultures are 
generally assumed to be more self-oriented and that people from collectivistic 
cultures should be more group-oriented, we are particularly interested in how they 
respond emotionally in a situation in which injustice targets them personally or 
as a group. When people experience negative emotions such as anger following 
injustice, they may want to suppress these feelings and forgive the offender to 
maintain a harmonious relationship with this person or to find inner peace for 
themselves (e.g., Ho & Fung, 2011). In two studies we investigate cultural differ-
ences in people’s motives to (not) forgive an offender (a close other or non-close 
other) in different situations (i.e., following an interpersonal transgression and 
following an ingroup transgression) and whether these motives reflect a stronger 
concern toward the self or toward others.
Cross-cultural differences in emotion regulation during everyday interactions
A first goal of this dissertation is to examine whether people with individualistic 
or collectivistic backgrounds differ in how they regulate their emotions in their 
everyday interactions and whether this depends on how close they are with their 
interaction partners. People usually regulate their emotions during their interac-
tions with others to reach positive outcomes such as establishing or maintaining 
relationships, or to avoid negative outcomes such as conflict or rejection (e.g., 
Elliot, 2008; Roseman, 2008). For instance, when people experience negative 
emotions such as irritation during social interactions, they may suppress these 
emotions because they may negatively affect their relationships with others. Yet, 
when people experience positive emotions such as joy during social interactions, 
they may want to share this with others and hence suppress these emotions less.
It is generally believed that the extent to which people regulate their emotions 
varies as a function of the cultural context in which they live (e.g., Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, Yoo, & Nakagawa, 2008). According to several 
researchers, people in collectivistic cultures are likely to suppress negative emo-
tions (e.g., anger) and positive emotions (e.g., self-pride) because they tend to 
be more concerned about not hurting other people’s feelings and also want to 
maintain harmonious relationships with them (e.g., Butler et al., 2007; Chiang, 







 1argued that people in individualistic cultures are less likely to suppress their emo-
tions during their interactions with others since by expressing how they feel, they 
can affirm their independence and self-worth (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Nevertheless, the extent to which people from individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures regulate their emotions during everyday interactions is still poorly under-
stood and many of the cross-cultural studies that have been done so far have been 
conducted in laboratory settings (e.g., Butler et al., 2007) or by means of surveys 
(e.g., Haga, Kraft, & Corby, 2009). Although such studies are valuable, they may 
not capture how people from different cultures regulate their emotions in their 
daily lives, in which they interact in different situations and with different people 
(e.g., close others such as family members and non-close others such as strangers). 
This calls for studies that are able to take this complexity into account. Therefore, 
in this study we will use a daily diary method, where people with individualistic 
or collectivistic backgrounds report for a period of two weeks the positive and 
negative emotions they experienced during their day-to-day social interactions, 
and the extent to which they suppressed these emotions. This allows us to assess 
across various interactive situations whether people from collectivistic cultures 
indeed engage in more emotion suppression than people from individualistic cul-
tures, and whether or not this depends on their relationship with their interaction 
partners.
Cross-cultural differences in emotional reactions to injustice 
A second goal of this dissertation is to examine cross-cultural differences in how 
people respond emotionally when they perceive injustice, and whether this de-
pends on whether the injustice affects them personally or affects the group of 
which they are a member. Researchers have argued that people care about justice 
because it serves important psychological needs such as the need for control, 
the need to belong, and the need for a positive self-regard (Cropanzano, Byrne, 
Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001).
It has been asserted that people’s concern about justice is universal, but that their 
responses to injustice may vary as a function of whether they define themselves 
as more independent (which should prevail in individualistic cultures) or more 
interdependent (which should be more common in collectivistic cultures (e.g., 
Brockner, Chen, Mannix, Leung, & Skarlicki, 2000; Van Prooijen & Zwenk, 
2009). Some researchers have made the case that people with more independent 
selves should respond more strongly to (un)fairness than those with more inter-
dependent selves because the outcomes (e.g., esteem, respect) that are associated 
with such procedures validate their individual characteristics and abilities (e.g., 
Van Prooijen & Zwenk, 2009). Others researchers have taken an opposite view, 
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however, and have argued that people with more interdependent selves should 
respond more strongly to (un)fairness because such procedures convey a message 
about their relationship with others and hence are relevant for their interdepen-
dent (or social) self (e.g., Brockner et al., 2000; Brockner, De Cremer, Van den 
Bos, & Chen, 2005; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a).
At present, however, it is still unclear whether responses to procedural injustice 
also vary across cultures that are more individualistic (and hence value indepen-
dence) or more collectivistic (and hence value interdependence). Most studies 
that have examined relationships between people’s self-definition and reactions to 
injustice have been conducted within a single culture. In these studies, research-
ers have activated people’s independent or interdependent self by using priming 
techniques (e.g., Van den Bos, Miedema, Vermunt, & Zwenk, 2011; Van Prooijen 
& Zwenk, 2009). As a result, we do not know whether people’s responses to 
injustice also varies as a function of whether they are from more individualistic or 
collectivistic backgrounds.
In this dissertation we will try to fill this gap by examining whether people 
with individualistic backgrounds (Dutch) differ from those with collectivistic 
backgrounds (Chinese) in their emotional responses to injustice. We will also 
examine whether this varies as a function of whether the injustice targets them 
as an individual or as a group. We do so because previous research has primarily 
focused on injustice that targets individuals whereas there are many instances of 
injustice that target people as a collective, such as not being accepted because of 
one’s ethnic background or being paid less because of gender (e.g., Licea, 2013; 
Schaafsma, 2008; Schaafsma, 2011).
Cross-cultural differences in motives to (not) forgive following interpersonal and ingroup 
transgressions 
A third goal of this dissertation is to examine whether people who live in individu-
alistic cultures differ from those in collectivistic cultures in their motives to (not) 
forgive people who have offended them or who have violated an important social 
norm. In the last years, researchers have begun to explore people’s motives to 
forgive (e.g., McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000; Exline, Worthington, 
Hill, & McCullough, 2003). This research shows that people can have different 
motives to forgive those who have hurt or offended them: they can do so out 
of concern for the self (self-focused motives), out of concern for the offender 
(offender-focused motives) or out of concern for their relationship with the of-
fender (relationship motives) (Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002; 







 1Researchers have asserted that the relative importance of these motives may 
differ between people from individualistic and collectivistic cultures (e.g., Hook 
et al., 2013; Sandage & Wiens, 2001). More specifically, they have argued that in 
individualistic cultures people should be more motivated to forgive out of concern 
for the self (e.g., restoring one’s own well-being) and that in collectivistic cultures 
people should be more motivated to forgive out of concern for the offender or 
their relationship with this person.
Currently, however, there is a dearth of knowledge on cross-cultural differences 
in people’s motives to forgive. The few studies that have compared forgiveness 
motives across cultures (e.g., Ballester, Chatri, Sastre, Rivière, & Mullet, 2011; 
Suwartono, Prawasti, & Mullet, 2007) have not compared the relative importance 
of motives that involve the self and motives that involve others (the offender and 
the relationship) within cultures. These studies also paint a mixed picture, by 
showing that relationship motives to forgive may also be important in individu-
alistic cultures and that self-focused motives can be important in collectivistic 
cultures as well (e.g., Strelan et al., 2013; Takada & Ohbuchi, 2004).
In this dissertation we will try to gain more insight into people’s motives to 
forgive and whether such motives differ or are similar across and within cultures. 
In doing so, we will not only focus on forgiveness motives following interpersonal 
transgressions, but also following transgressions that occur within groups. We 
do so because research on forgiveness has generally examined motives from an 
intrapersonal or interpersonal perspective and less from an ingroup perspective. 
Nevertheless, transgressions may also occur at the group level, such as when 
ingroup members violate important group norms. In such a situation, concerns 
about the group (e.g., protection of group values and group harmony) may be-
come important as well. To assess this, we also focus on motives that concern the 
welfare of the group (so-called group motives), in addition to motives that focus 
on the self, the offender and the relationship, and we examine whether such group 
motives are more important in collectivistic than in individualistic settings.
OvErvIEw Of ThE prESENT dISSErTaTION
In the following chapters we report four studies. In Chapter 2, we examine how 
people with different cultural backgrounds regulate their emotions in their daily 
encounters with other people. More specifically, we examine whether people from 
collectivistic backgrounds are indeed more likely to suppress positive and nega-
tive emotions during their everyday interactions than those with individualistic 
backgrounds and whether this also depends on their relationship (i.e., close or 
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non-close) with the interaction partners. For this purpose, we use a daily social in-
teraction method, developed by Wheeler & Nezlek (1977). The sample consists of 
Dutch students, Chinese exchange students in the Netherlands, and descendants 
of Moluccan immigrants in the Netherlands (who are also students). We include a 
Dutch Moluccan sample to examine whether emotion regulation may be different 
when people from collectivistic backgrounds have grown up in a culture that is 
more individualistic.
Chapter 3 examines how people with individualistic and collectivistic back-
grounds respond emotionally to injustice. We are particularly interested in whether 
people from collectivistic cultures respond more negatively (i.e., feelings of anger 
and disappointment) to injustice that targets them as a group, and whether those 
from individualistic cultures respond more negatively when injustice targets 
them individually. For this, we conduct a laboratory experiment with Dutch 
and Chinese exchange students, in which injustice is manipulated by depriving 
participants (personally or as a group) of a monetary reward.
In Chapter 4, we focus on people’s motives to forgive following an interpersonal 
conflict. We are interested in whether people who live in a more collectivistic 
culture (the Moluccan islands, Indonesia) attach more importance to motives 
that involve a concern for others (relationship, offender) and whether those who 
live in a more individualistic culture (the Netherlands) attach more importance 
to motives that involve concerns for the self. We also investigate whether the 
endorsement of these forgiveness motives depends on whether the offender is a 
close or a non-close other. To this end, participants are asked to think about a 
conflict that they had with someone (either a close other or a non-close other) and 
to indicate how important various forgiveness motives (involving concerns about 
the relationship, the offender and the self ) are to them.
Chapter 5 concentrates on people’s motives to (not) forgive ingroup deviants 
following the violation of an important group norm. We are particularly interested 
in whether concerns about the group may also be important in such a situation 
(in addition to motives that involve the self, the offender and the relationship) 
and whether this varies as a function of whether people live in cultural settings 
that are more individualistic or collectivistic. The sample in this study consist of 
members of an intervillage alliance, called ‘pela’, in Indonesia. They live either in 
Indonesia (a more collectivistic setting) or in the Netherlands (a more individual-
istic setting). In this study, we ask participants to put themselves in a hypothetical 
situation where someone (a close other or a non-close other) violates an important 
norm of pela.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we summarize the results and discuss the findings and 




Cross-cultural differences in emotion suppression in 
everyday interactions
This chapter is based on: 
Huwaë, S., & Schaafsma, J.(2016). Cross-cultural differences in emotion 











In everyday life, when people feel sad, they may try to hide this by putting on a 
happy face. Or, when they feel happy, they may try to hide their smile and keep 
a straight face instead. When people try not to show their emotions, emotion 
suppression occurs (Gross, Richards, & John, 2006). The extent to which people 
suppress their emotions may be influenced by their cultural background (e.g., 
Matsumoto, Takeuchi, Andayani, Kouznetsova, &Krupp, 1998). For example, 
it has been argued that emotion suppression may vary as a function of whether 
people are from a more collectivistic or individualistic culture (e.g., Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991).
According to several authors, emotion suppression is more likely to occur in col-
lectivistic than in individualistic cultures because mutual obligations and harmoni-
ous relationships with ingroup members are generally emphasized in such cultures 
(e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). For example, it has been argued that people in 
collectivistic cultures tend to find values such as interdependence and obligation 
to group members important and tend to focus on what others feel, think and 
want (e.g., Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988; Singelis, 1994). 
It has also been suggested that because of this, people from collectivistic cultures 
may want to suppress positive (e.g., self-pride) or negative emotions (e.g., irrita-
tion) so that others are not hurt and harmonious relationships are preserved (e.g., 
Chiang, 2012). In individualistic cultures, however, independence and autonomy 
are generally valued and the emphasis appears to be more on being different from 
others than on obligation to and harmony with others (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). It has been argued that in such settings, being open and expressing one’s 
feelings -- positive and negative -- may be important, because this is a way in 
which people can affirm their self-worth (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
By now, there is some empirical evidence that indeed supports the idea that 
emotion suppression is more likely to occur among people with collectivistic 
backgrounds than among people with individualistic backgrounds (e.g., Gross 
et al., 2006). For example, studies in the United States have found that Asian 
Americans suppress their emotions more than European Americans (e.g., Eng, 
2012). In addition, English and John (2013) found in a sample of Chinese and 
US participants that the former used more emotion suppression than the lat-
ter. Nevertheless, most of the studies on cross-cultural differences in emotion 
regulation have been conducted in laboratory settings or have relied on surveys. 
Although valuable, such studies may not adequately capture how people regulate 
their emotions in their everyday lives because they ignore the social context in 
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which people interact and are also prone to various biases (e.g., recall biases; see 
Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008).
The aim of the present study is to address this and to examine how people 
with collectivistic and individualistic backgrounds regulate their emotions in 
their everyday interactions, by using a daily diary method. More specifically, 
we investigated whether members of collectivistic cultures are more likely than 
members of individualistic cultures to suppress positive and negative emotions 
in their interactions with others. We also examined whether people’s tendency to 
suppress emotions varies as a function of whether they interact with close or non-
close others. We did so because there is reason to believe that -- although people 
from collectivistic cultures may be prone to suppress their emotions -- they may 
be less likely to do so (particularly positive emotions) in interactions with close 
others than with non-close others. For example, research by Matsumoto (1990) 
suggests that in a collectivistic culture such as Japan, people may find it more 
appropriate to express positive emotions (e.g., happiness) and to suppress negative 
emotions (e.g., disgust) with ingroup members (e.g., family) than with out-group 
members (e.g., casual acquaintances). A possible reason for this is that in col-
lectivistic cultures, people tend to be relatively dependent upon a stable ingroup. 
These ingroups can be very demanding and generally require a considerable degree 
of harmony and cohesion (e.g., Triandis et al., 1988). Thus, when people from 
collectivistic cultures interact with people who belong to their inner circle, they 
may be motivated to express their positive emotions because such feelings can 
foster a degree of connectedness and harmony (Uchida & Kitayama, 2009).
In individualistic cultures, however, people tend to rely less on one stable in-
group and they are more likely to be dependent on and form attachments with 
relative strangers (e.g., Schug, Yuki, & Maddux, 2010). Although people from 
individualistic cultures may generally suppress emotions less, this relative depen-
dence on strangers may motivate them to regulate their emotions (and negative 
emotions in particular) with non-close others. In this way, they can prevent 
negative interactions and build up and maintain positive relationships with them. 
Preliminary support for this idea comes from a study by Matsumoto (1990), who 
found that Americans generally considered it less appropriate than Japanese to 
express negative emotions such as anger towards out-groups. In a similar vein, 
Matsumoto et al. (1998) found that Americans tend to regulate negative emotions 
more towards strangers than towards family members.
To examine whether there are such cross-cultural differences in how people 
suppress their emotions in their everyday interactions, we conducted a daily social 
interaction study among Dutch, Chinese and Moluccans in the Netherlands. 
Dutch participants were students who were born and raised in the Netherlands, 
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which is generally considered an individualistic culture (Hofstede, 2001). Chinese 
participants were exchange students who had been living in the Netherlands for 
an average of a year. They were all born and raised in China, which is commonly 
regarded as a collectivistic culture. Moluccan participants were students who were 
born and raised in the Netherlands. Their parents or grandparents immigrated 
from the archipelago “the Moluccas” in Indonesia (a former Dutch colony) to 
the Netherlands in 1951 or 1962 (Tunjanan, 2008). Most of the Moluccan im-
migrants have lived as a close community in so-called Moluccan residential areas. 
Some still live there, whereas others have moved to a Dutch neighborhood. Their 
culture is generally considered collectivistic, which manifests itself in a strong 
emphasis on family ties and mutual assistance (Rinsampessy, 1992).We included 
Moluccans in our sample because little attention has been given to the possibility 
that emotion regulation may change when people have moved to or have grown 
up in a different culture (De Leersnyder, Mesquita, & Kim, 2011). For example, 
Eng (2012) found that the longer Asian Americans had lived in the United States, 
the less likely they were to suppress their emotions. For this reason, we expect that 
people from collectivistic backgrounds are less likely to suppress their emotions 
when they have lived most of their lives in an individualistic setting, as compared 
to those who were born and raised in a collectivistic setting.
METhOd
Participants
The initial sample of this diary study consisted of 80 Dutch (N = 32), Chinese 
(N = 25), and Moluccan (N = 23) students from a Dutch university or a Dutch 
school for higher professional education. They were recruited via a subject pool, 
social networks or social media and received course credits or €20 for participat-
ing in this study. Dutch and Moluccan participants were born and raised in the 
Netherlands. Chinese participants were exchange students who were born and 
raised in China.
After inspection of their data, five Chinese and four Moluccan participants were 
excluded from the analyses as they failed to complete questionnaires or registered 
less than a total of four interactions. The final sample consisted of 32 persons of 
Dutch origin (24 women; Mage = 21.00, SD = 1.80), 19 persons of Moluccan 
origin (14 women; Mage = 24.63, SD = 2.67) and 20 persons of Chinese origin (14 
women; Mage = 23.60, SD = 2.09). Unfortunately, we were unable to find more 
Moluccan and Chinese participants. They were often difficult to reach or felt that 
the study was too time consuming. The length of stay of Chinese participants 
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in the Netherlands varied from 7 months to 3.7 years (Myear = 1.69, SD = 1.11). 
In terms of their cultural identification (assessed with an adjusted version of the 
Psychological Acculturation Scale, Schaafsma, Nezlek, Krejtz, & Safron, 2010), 
Moluccans and Chinese identified more strongly with their culture of origin (M = 
5.33, SD = 0.94 and M = 4.07, SD = 1.04, respectively) than with Dutch culture 
(M = 4.57, SD = 0.92 and M = 5.86, SD = 1.03, respectively), ts >17.08, ps < 
.001.
Over a period of 14 days, the Dutch participants described 981 interactions (M 
= 30.66, SD = 9.16), the Moluccan participants described 519 interactions (M = 
27.31, SD = 11.29) and the Chinese participants described 343 interactions (M 
= 17.15, SD = 5.52).
Social interaction diary
Participants were told that the study was on how people interact with others 
in their everyday lives and how they feel during these interactions. Before they 
started with the diary, participants received instructions (by phone or during a 
meeting) on how to fill out the diary form.
To measure people’s daily interactions, we used a variant of the Rochester Inter-
action Record (Wheeler & Nezlek, 1977). For 2 weeks, participants described (via 
an online form) each face-to-face interaction (Skype included) that lasted longer 
than 10 minutes. They were asked to record each interaction after it had occurred 
or at a later time that day, but before midnight. Every day at 6 p.m., participants 
were reminded by e-mail to fill out the diary.
Participants described with whom they had interacted, by providing their ini-
tials, gender, age and cultural background. They also described their relationship 
with their interaction partners. In the present study, we were primarily interested 
in differences in interactions that involved close others (family, partner, romantic 
friend, or good friend) or non-close others (acquaintance, colleague, fellow stu-
dent, supervisor, teacher, or stranger). Participants also described other aspects of 
the interaction (e.g., duration, purpose) that are not discussed in this paper.
For each interaction, participants rated the negative emotions (irritated, frus-
trated, ashamed and guilty) and positive emotions (proud, satisfied, respected 
and accepted) that they had experienced. They also indicated to what extent they 
had suppressed their positive and negative emotions. For this, we adjusted two 
emotion suppression items from the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & 
John, 2003): “When I was feeling positive emotions, I was careful not to express 
them,” and “When I was feeling negative emotions, I was careful not to express 
them.” Each item was rated on a 9-point scale (1= not at all, 9 = very much).
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Dutch and Moluccan participants completed the diary form in Dutch. Owing 
to software and technical issues, all research materials for the Chinese participants 
(exchange students who were all relatively fluent in English) were written in 
English. To make sure that they understood the meaning of the emotion items in 
the diary form, they were given an additional instruction form with clarifications 
of these items in both English and Chinese. These items were first translated into 
Chinese by a Chinese native speaker and then back translated into English by 
three other Chinese native speakers. We verified the clarity of the translated items 
during an instruction meeting with Chinese participants.
Trait-level measures
Before and after completing the diary study, participants completed a question-
naire so that we could compare our samples in terms of a number of important 
background variables: the extent to which they defined themselves as more in-
dependent (which is emphasized in individualistic cultures) or interdependent 
(which is emphasized in collectivistic cultures), and the extent to which they 
generally suppress emotions.
Participants’ independent and interdependent selves were measured prior to the 
diary study, using the Singelis Self-Construal scale. This is a 24-item scale that 
consists of an interdependent subscale (e.g., “I feel good when I cooperate with 
others”) and an independent subscale (e.g., “I enjoy being unique and different 
from others in many respects”). Participants rated each item on a 7-point scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha for the independent 
subscale was .76 for Dutch, .71 for Moluccan and .42 for Chinese participants. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the interdependent subscale was .65 for Dutch, .62 for 
Moluccan and .82 for Chinese participants.
Trait-level emotion suppression was assessed after participants had completed 
the diary forms. For this, we used the four suppression items from the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (e.g., “I keep my feelings to myself ”; Gross & John, 
2003). Each item was rated on a 7-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly 
agree). Cronbach’s alpha was .75 for Dutch, .79 for Moluccan and .64 for Chinese 
participants.
rESulTS
The data collected in this study have a multi-level structure: interactions (Level 
1) are nested within persons (Level 2). To analyze these data, we used hierarchical 
linear modelling (HLM 6; Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2004). Conceptually, 
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one could argue that we should estimate three-level models, because interactions 
are nested within persons and persons are nested within cultural groups. There 
were, however, not enough cultural groups to reliably estimate such models (see 
Nezlek, 2011). Therefore, we treated cultural group as a person-level variable.
To understand the extent to which participants suppressed positive and negative 
emotions, we examined whether the three cultural groups in our sample differed in 
the negative and positive emotions that they reported. We also examined whether 
this varied as a function of whether interactions involved close or non-close oth-
ers. We then analyzed whether the three groups differed in the extent to which 
they suppressed negative and positive emotions, and whether this depended on 
who the co-interactants were. Finally, we examined relationships between self-
construal and emotion regulation in the different samples.
Before we conducted these analyses, we checked whether the three groups dif-
fered in trait-level emotional suppression and in their independent and interde-
pendent self-construal. For these analyses, we used analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 
to estimate differences between the groups and paired samples tests to examine 
differences within groups.
Preliminary analyses: Cross-cultural differences in trait-level emotional suppression and self-
construal
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed significant differences between 
the groups in trait emotional suppression, F(2, 64) = 4.12, p = .021. A contrast 
analysis showed that Chinese participants scored higher on the trait emotional 
suppression scale (M = 3.88, SD = 1.11) than Moluccan participants (M = 2.75, 
SD = 1.31), F(2, 64) = 8.24, p = .006. They also scored somewhat higher than 
Dutch participants on this scale (M = 3.31, SD = 1.10), F(2, 64) = 2.72, p = .10. 
No differences were found between Moluccan and Dutch participants in average 
emotion suppression, F(2, 64) = 2.62, p = .11.
We also examined whether the independent and interdependent self-construal 
scores differed within the three groups. We found that Chinese participants scored 
higher on interdependent self-construal (M = 4.93, SD = 0.77) than on indepen-
dent self-construal (M = 4.58, SD = 0.56), t(19) = 2.16, p = .044. Moluccans 
scored somewhat higher on independent self-construal (M = 4.77, SD = 0.71) 
than on interdependent self-construal (M = 4.44, SD = 0.67), t(18) = 1.76, p = 
.095. Interestingly, the average scores of Dutch participants on independent (M 
= 4.66, SD = 0.73) and interdependent self-construal (M = 4.60, SD = 0.56) did 
not differ, t(31) = .45, p = .66.
Furthermore, we checked whether the three groups differed in their average 
scores on independent and interdependent self-construal. A one-way ANOVA 
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revealed a trend for interdependent self-construal, F(2, 68) = 2.93, p = .060. Chi-
nese participants scored somewhat higher on this scale (M = 4.93) than Moluccan 
(M = 4.44, p = .041) and Dutch participants (M = 4.60, p = .060). Moluccan and 
Dutch participants did not differ in this regard, p = .38. The mean independent 
self-construal scores did not differ across the three groups (Chinese = 4.58, Mo-
luccan = 4.77, Dutch = 4.66), F(2, 68) = 0.38, p = .69.
Cross-cultural differences in the experience and suppression of  negative emotions in everyday 
interactions
We then examined cross-cultural differences in the suppression of negative emo-
tions during everyday interactions. For this purpose, we first examined whether 
the three cultural groups differed in the negative emotions that they reported. 
We estimated a Level 1 model that was “totally unconditional,” meaning that no 
predictors were entered:
Level 1 ∶ yij = β0j + rij
We analyzed differences between the three cultural groups with the following 
model at Level 2:
Level 2 ∶ β0j = γ11 (MO) + γ12 (CH) + γ13 (DU) + u1j
In these models, MO, CH and DU were dummy-coded predictors representing 
each cultural group (Molucccans, Chinese and Dutch, respectively). We entered 
these predictors uncentred and dropped the intercept so that the resulting coef-
ficients represent the means for each cultural group. These means were compared 
using chi-square tests of fixed effects. As can be seen in Table 2.1 (top panel), the 
three groups did not differ in the extent to which they reported negative emotions, 
with the exception that Chinese participants reported somewhat more irritation 
during their interactions than Dutch participants, χ2(1) = 3.59, p = .055.
Following this, we analyzed whether the negative emotions that participants 
reported depended on who the co-interactants were. For this, we estimated so-
called no-intercept models at Level 1, in which we entered two dummy-coded 
predictors (uncentred) representing whether the interaction involved close others 
or non-close others:
Level 1 ∶ yij = β1j (Close) + β2j (Non-Close) + rij
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Ashamed 1.82 2.04 1.78
Guilty 1.77 1.91 1.56
Irritated 2.13 2.08 1.72 
Frustrated 2.34 2.26 2.19
Positive
Accepted 7.20a 7.89b 7.42ac
Respected 7.14a 7.88b 7.25a
Proud 5.47a 6.51b 5.64a
Satisfied 6.34a 6.95b 6.84b
Note. Within rows, means not sharing a subscript were significantly different at .05 or beyond. In rows 
with no subscripts, no pair of means was significantly different.
At Level 2, we again used a set of dummy-coded predictors, representing each 
cultural group. We entered these predictors uncentred and dropped the intercept 
so that the resulting coefficients represent the means for each cultural group across 
interactions that involve close or non-close others:
Level 2 ∶ β1j = γ11 (MO) + γ12 (CH) + γ13 (DU) + u1j
	 β2j = γ21 (MO) + γ22 (CH) + γ23 (DU) + u2j
We compared these means using chi-square tests of fixed effects. The results can be 
found in Table 2.2 (top panel).
We found that Chinese participants reported more irritation and frustration in 
interactions with non-close others than with close others, χ2(1) = 8.06, p = .005 
and χ2(1) = 7.13, p = .008, respectively. Dutch also reported more irritation with 
non-close than with close others, χ2(1) = 3.79, p = .049. Moluccans reported more 
guilt with close than with non-close others, χ2(1) = 14.03, p < .001.
We then examined cross-cultural differences in the extent to which participants 
suppressed their negative emotions. For this, we again estimated a model at 
Level 1 that was totally unconditional. At Level 2, we entered three dummy-
coded variables (uncentred) representing each cultural group, and we dropped 
the intercept (see Table 2.3). In line with the idea that people from collectivistic 
cultures regulate their emotions more than people from individualistic cultures, 
we found that Chinese participants suppressed negative emotions more than 
Dutch participants, χ2(1) = 24.48, p < .001. Interestingly, Chinese participants 
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also suppressed negative emotions more than Moluccans, χ2(1) = 25.32, p < .001. 
Moluccan and Dutch participants did not differ in the extent to which they sup-
pressed negative emotions, χ2(1) = .16, p > .50. In an additional set of analyses, 
we examined whether these findings were related to differences in self-construal. 
For this, we added the interaction between each cultural group and self-construal 
(interdependent or independent, standardized within each sample) at Level 2. 
These analyses revealed that in the Chinese sample, participants who were higher 
in interdependent self-construal were indeed more likely to suppress negative 
emotions, B = .098, p = .018. In the Dutch and Moluccan samples, however, 
no relationships were found between interdependent self-construal and negative 
emotion suppression (Bs < .32, ps > .54). Furthermore, across the three samples, 
no relationships were found between independent self-construal and negative 
emotion suppression (Bs < .58, ps > .12).
Table 2.2. Means for negative and positive emotions during interactions with close and 
non-close others (comparisons within cultural groups)
Dutch Moluccan Chinese
Close Non-Close Close Non-Close Close Non-Close
Negative
Ashamed 1.76 1.94† 2.05 2.03 1.69 2.09†
Guilty 1.76 1.78 2.09*** 1.49 1.52 1.71
Irritated 2.03 2.34* 2.18 1.88 1.52 2.42**
Frustrated 2.25 2.50 2.34 2.18 1.96 2.99**
Positive
Accepted 7.45*** 6.72 8.05* 7.58 7.67** 6.68
Respected 7.36*** 6.70 8.00* 7.61 7.42** 6.66
Proud 5.53 5.34 6.55 6.45 5.77† 5.29
Satisfied 6.38 6.27 6.95 6.96 7.15*** 5.95
***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05 †p < .10
Table 2.3. Means for emotion suppression during interactions across cultural groups
Dutch Moluccan Chinese
Negative Emotions 2.99a 2.85a 5.14b
Positive Emotions 1.64a 1.97a 3.21b
Note. Within rows, means not sharing a subscript were significantly different at .05 or beyond.
Finally, we analyzed whether participants’ negative emotion suppression varied as 
a function of who the co-interactants were. This analysis is comparable to the one 
that we described above (estimating differences across the three groups in negative 
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emotions experienced during interactions with close and non-close others) and 
the results can be found in Table 2.4. In line with our expectations, we found that 
Dutch suppressed negative emotions more with non-close others than with close 
others, χ2(1) = 18.92, p < .001. For Chinese and Moluccan participants, however, 
no such differences were found, χ2(1) = 1.95, p = .16 and χ2(1) = 1.55, p = .21, 
respectively. Follow-up analyses revealed no relationships between interdependent 
or independent self-construal and negative emotion suppression with close or 
non-close others in the three groups (Bs < .47, ps > .26).
Table 2.4. Means for emotion suppression during interactions with close or non-close 
others (comparisons within cultural groups)
Dutch Moluccan Chinese
Close Non-Close Close Non-Close Close Non-Close
Negative Emotions 2.72 3.58*** 2.74 3.10 5.05 5.38
Positive Emotions 1.52 1.90** 1.90 2.20 2.97 3.91***
***p < .001 **p < .01
Cross-cultural differences in the experience and suppression of  positive emotions in everyday 
interactions
To analyze the extent to which participants suppressed positive emotions, we 
conducted a series of analyses similar to the ones that we described in the previous 
section. These analyses revealed that Moluccan participants reported more posi-
tive feelings such as acceptance, respect and pride during their interactions than 
Chinese (χ2s > 3.65, ps < .054) and Dutch participants (χ2s > 9.08, ps < .004). 
Moluccan and Chinese participants also reported more satisfaction than Dutch 
participants, χ2(1) = 7.54, p = .006 and χ2(1) = 3.81, p = .048, respectively (see 
Table 2.1, bottom panel). The positive emotions that participants reported also 
depended on the co-interactants. Across the three groups, participants felt more 
accepted and respected with close others than with non-close others, χ2s > 5.03, 
ps < .023; χ2s > 4.17, ps < .038, respectively. Chinese participants also reported 
more satisfaction with close than with non-close others, χ2(1) = 16.77, p <.001 
(see Table 2.2, bottom panel).
As expected, the three groups differed in the extent to which they suppressed 
positive emotions during their interactions (see Table 2.3). Chinese participants 
suppressed positive emotions more than Dutch and Moluccan participants (χ2(1) 
= 20.70, p < .001 and χ2(1) = 10.26, p = .002, respectively). No differences were 
found between Moluccan and Dutch participants, χ2(1) = 2.28, p = .12. Interest-
ingly, follow-up analyses revealed no relationships between interdependent self-
construal and positive emotion suppression across the three samples, Bs > .29, ps 
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> .09. In the Dutch sample, however, there was a negative relationship between 
independent self-construal and positive emotion suppression, B = -.27, p = .048. 
No such relationship was found in the Chinese and Moluccan samples, Bs < .35, 
ps > .56.
In line with our expectations, we also found that Chinese participants suppressed 
positive emotions less in interactions with close others than with non-close others, 
χ2(1) = 17.04, p < .001 (see Table 2.4). A similar pattern was found for Dutch 
participants: they suppressed positive emotions less with close others than with 
non-close others, χ2(1) = 7.30, p = .007. No such differences were found for 
Moluccans, χ2(1) = 1.92, p = .16. Across the three samples, however, we found no 
relationships between interdependent or independent self-construal and positive 
emotion suppression in close or non-close interactions, Bs < .46, ps > .17.
dISCuSSION
The aim of the present study was to examine cross-cultural differences in emo-
tion regulation in everyday interactions. More specifically, we examined whether 
people with collectivistic backgrounds (Chinese) suppress positive and negative 
emotions more during their daily interactions as compared to people with an 
individualistic background (Dutch). In addition, we examined whether suppres-
sion of positive and negative emotions varies as a function of whether interactions 
are with close others or not. We also explored whether emotion suppression may 
change when people have grown-up in a different culture. For this purpose, our 
sample also consisted of Moluccans who were born and raised in the Netherlands.
Our findings support the idea that people who are born and raised in a col-
lectivistic culture suppress their emotions more during their everyday interactions 
than people from individualistic cultures. Although the three groups in our study 
did not differ much in the emotions that they reported, we found that Chinese 
participants suppressed both positive and negative emotions more than Dutch 
participants. We also found that this was related to differences in self-construal. 
In the Chinese sample, participants with a more interdependent self-construal 
were more likely to suppress negative emotions (but not positive emotions). In 
the Dutch sample, participants with a more independent self-construal were less 
likely to suppress positive emotions (but not negative emotions). These findings 
lend support for the idea that people from collectivistic backgrounds may be 
particularly motivated to maintain harmony during their interactions with oth-
ers, whereas people with individualistic backgrounds may be more motivated to 
express their (positive) feelings (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994).
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In line with our expectations, we also found that emotion suppression depended 
on who the co-interactants were. Even though Chinese participants suppressed 
their emotions more than Dutch and Moluccan participants, they suppressed 
positive emotions less with close others than with non-close others. And, despite 
the fact that they generally suppressed their emotions less, Dutch participants did 
suppress negative emotions more with non-close others than with close-others. 
These findings may reflect a basic difference in the meaning of close versus non-
close relationships in collectivistic and individualistic cultures. In collectivistic 
cultures, people generally belong to and are dependent upon a stable ingroup 
and so they may express positive emotions with those who belong to the inner 
circle because this may foster their connectedness with them (e.g., Triandis et al., 
1988). Nevertheless, in individualistic cultures, relationships are more flexible and 
people tend to be more dependent upon others from outside their inner circle as 
well (e.g., Schug et al., 2010). They may therefore suppress negative emotions 
with those who do not belong to their inner circle as this may help them establish 
positive relationships with them or avoid negative interactions.
It is important to note, however, that across the different samples we did not 
find relationships between the self-construal measures (independent or interde-
pendent) and the suppression of positive or negative emotions in close or non-
close interactions. It is possible that the relatively small samples and the moderate 
to low internal consistency of some of the Singelis self-construal subscales made it 
more difficult to reliably detect such relationships (for a discussion on the validity 
of self-construal scales, see Levine et al., 2003). We cannot rule out, however, that 
our findings reflect other differences across the samples that we did not assess. More 
insight is also needed into the underlying motives of people from collectivistic and 
individualistic cultures to suppress or display their emotions in relationships with 
close or non-close others. For example, the fact that Dutch participants not only 
suppressed negative emotions but also suppressed positive emotions more with 
non-close than with close others suggests that they do not necessarily seek to 
establish positive relationships with them but may be motivated to avoid nega-
tive interactions. Future research will therefore need to consider more fully why 
people across different cultures suppress emotions and whether they do so to reach 
positive outcomes (e.g., harmony and acceptance) or to avoid negative outcomes 
(e.g., conflict and rejection; see Roseman, 2008).
Interestingly, our findings also suggest that emotion suppression depends on 
the larger cultural setting in which people have been raised. We found that Mo-
luccan participants suppressed positive and negative emotions less than Chinese 
participants (who had only recently arrived in the Netherlands) but did not differ 
from Dutch participants in this regard. Moluccans also did not differ from Dutch 
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participants on a trait measure of emotion suppression. This finding is consistent 
with previous studies that have found that the longer people with collectivistic 
backgrounds live in an individualistic society, the less they suppress their emotions 
(e.g., Eng, 2012). A possible explanation is that they may have adopted the values 
of the host society. For example, we found that Moluccan participants defined 
themselves as somewhat more independent than interdependent. Remarkably, 
however, they did not regulate their emotions differently with close or non-close 
others. It is possible that this is related to their position as immigrants, as they 
may not only depend strongly on their ingroup but also on out-group members. 
Nevertheless, at present we cannot draw firm conclusions regarding this possibility 
so more studies are needed to address this issue. To more accurately establish how 
emotion regulation may change as a function of acculturation processes, future 
studies should also compare first or second generation immigrants with recent 
arrivals of the same ethnic group.
To our knowledge, the present study is the first to examine cross-cultural dif-
ferences in emotion regulation in people’s everyday interactions, using a daily 
diary method. Notwithstanding the value of this method, we are aware that it 
may be sensitive to biases as well (e.g., selective reporting and social desirability; 
see Schwartz & Sudman, 1992). We also had to make several limiting decisions 
regarding the measures that we used. For example, although we did ask partici-
pants about the specific emotions that they experienced during their interactions, 
we did not ask them to what extent they suppressed each emotion but we used a 
global measure instead. Yet, it is possible that there are cross-cultural differences in 
the specific negative or positive emotions that people suppress (e.g., Matsumoto, 
1990). Another limitation concerns the samples that we used. Although this study 
included groups that have traditionally been under-represented in research (e.g., 
Moluccans), it is important to note that the number of participants in each sample 
was small (also because they were difficult to reach) which makes it more difficult 
to draw firm conclusions about group-based differences in emotion suppression 
and limits the generalizability of our findings. As such, the findings need to be 
replicated with larger samples. Furthermore, Chinese participants were exchange 
students who were not living in their country of origin. This may have affected the 
nature of their interactions and how they regulated their emotions during these 
interactions. In this regard, it is also important to note that Chinese participants 
reported less interactions than Moluccan and Dutch participants.
Nevertheless, the present study advances research on emotion suppression in 
important ways as it provides a nuanced perspective on cross-cultural differences 
in everyday emotion regulation. Although we found support for the idea that 
members of collectivistic cultures suppress emotions more than members of indi-
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vidualistic cultures, our findings also suggest that this depends on the interaction 
partner(s) and on the cultural setting in which people have been raised. We believe 
that future cross-cultural research on emotion regulation should consider the use 
of daily diary methods, as these methods may allow us to more fully understand 




Cross-cultural differences in emotional responses to 
injustice targeting an individual or group
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In the previous chapter, we examined the positive and negative emotions that 
people with individualistic or collectivistic backgrounds experience during their 
day-to-day interactions. In this chapter, we concentrate on the negative emotions 
that they may experience when they are being treated unfairly. We do so because 
people may encounter injustice in many aspects of their everyday lives: when 
someone jumps the queue at a bus or breaks a promise, or when people discrimi-
nate against them because of their age, gender, ethnic background or disability. 
Research has shown that such instances of injustice can elicit negative emotions 
such as disappointment, anger, and frustration (e.g., Bembenek, Beike, &Schro-
eder, 2007; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; Mark, 1985), and can also negatively 
affect people’s psychological well-being and their self-esteem (e.g., Koper, Van 
Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993; Tepper, 2001).
It has been argued that people’s reactions to (un)fairness may depend on whether 
they define themselves as more independent (as is the case in more individualistic 
settings such as the Netherlands) or as more interdependent (as is the case in 
more collectivistic settings such as China) (e.g., Brockner, Chen, Mannix, Leung, 
& Skarlicki, 2000; Van Prooijen & Zwenk, 2009). Some researchers have made 
the case that people with a more independent (or individual) self should respond 
more strongly to (un)fair procedures than those with a more interdependent 
(social) self, because such procedures inform them about whether or not they are 
valued and respected, and hence have implications for their feelings of self-worth 
(e.g., Van Prooijen & Zwenk, 2009). Consistent with this idea, Van Prooijen and 
Zwenk (2009) found that people’s reactions to a fair vs. unfair voice procedure 
(i.e., having versus not having the opportunity to express their opinion about a 
reward allocation) were stronger when their independent self was activated than 
when their interdependent self was activated. Other researchers, however, have 
suggested that procedural (in)justice should have a stronger impact on those with 
an interdependent self, because it conveys a message about the quality of their 
relationships with others (e.g., Brockner et al., 2000; Brockner, De Cremer, Van 
den Bos, & Chen, 2005; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a). Support for this view comes 
from Brockner and colleagues (2005). In their study, participants were either 
asked or not asked to voice their opinion about a decision to hire a new employee. 
It was found that participants with a more interdependent self engaged in more 
cooperative behavior when they had been given the opportunity to voice their 
opinion, but not when they had been deprived of this opportunity.
Most studies in this area, however, have not examined whether people’s responses 
to unfairness also vary across cultures that are more individualistic (and hence 
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value independence) or more collectivistic (and hence value interdependence) 
(e.g., Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005b). Instead, the 
studies that have been conducted so far have activated participants from one cul-
ture with an independent self or interdependent self (e.g., Van den Bos, Miedema, 
Vermunt, & Zwenk, 2011; Van Prooijen & Zwenk, 2009). Although these studies 
are valuable, it is important to examine whether people’s responses to injustice also 
depend on whether their cultural background is individualistic or collectivistic.
Previous research on how people’s self-definition affects their reactions to in-
justice has also been limited to injustice that targets a specific individual whereas 
there are many instances of injustice that target people as a collective. For example, 
in their everyday lives, people may experience that their social group is being dis-
criminated against or deprived of resources compared to other social groups (e.g., 
Schaafsma, 2008; Schaafsma, 2011). One could argue that injustice that targets a 
group rather than a specific individual may be particularly threatening to people 
with collectivistic backgrounds because they are more likely to feel connected to 
their social environment and use the group to define themselves and to evaluate 
themselves (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Moreover, when injustice targets 
people as a collective, this generally involves a comparison between one’s own 
group and another group and research suggests that such intergroup comparisons 
are particularly important for people with a more interdependent self, as they 
derive part of their self-esteem from comparing their own group to other groups 
(e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi & Cotting, 1999; Tyler 
& Smith, 1999). This could imply that, compared to people with individualistic 
backgrounds, those with collectivistic backgrounds may respond more negatively 
to injustice that targets them as a collective versus injustice that targets them as 
an individual.
At the same time, however, it is possible that when injustice targets people as a 
collective, they are still primarily concerned with how this affects them personally 
(i.e., their own gains and losses) (e.g., Sedikides & Gaertner, 2001). For example, 
Foster and Matheson (1999) found that women evaluated discrimination on the 
basis of their gender as an attack against the individual self as well, perhaps by 
reasoning that “what happens to the group could also happen to me”. One could 
also argue that being a member of a group may primarily serve the needs of the 
individual such as protection of one’s independent self and validation of one’s 
inner attributes (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sedikides & Gaertner, 2001). 
Thus, in a group setting concerns about “what’s in it for me”, may be as important 
as “what’s in it for us”. Consequently, when injustice targets people as a collective, 
they may perceive this as an attack against their independent selves as well: what 
harms the group, harms the individual (Sedikides & Gaertner, 2001). This could 
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imply that people from collectivistic and individualistic cultures may not differ in 
how they respond to injustice that targets them as a group.
As it stands, it is unclear whether people from individualistic and collectivistic 
backgrounds differ in how they respond to injustice and whether this also varies 
as a function of whether the injustice targets them individually or as a collective. 
The present study sought to address this issue, in a sample of Dutch and Chinese 
students. We used an injustice manipulation that was similar to one of the three 
most frequently mentioned unjust events in Mikula’s study (1986), which was 
breaking an agreement or promise by changing the (experimental) procedure in 
favour of other participants. In terms of people’s reactions, we focused on feel-
ings of anger and disappointment. Feelings of anger may emerge when people 
believe that existing rules have been violated, while feelings of disappointment 
may emerge when people are being deprived of a favourable outcome (Bembenek 
et al., 2007; Krehbiel et al., 2000).
METhOd
Participants and design 
A total of 44 Chinese exchange students in the Netherlands (16 men, 28 women; 
Mage = 23.9, SD = 2.67) and 48 undergraduate Dutch students (17 men, 31 
women; Mage = 20.0, SD = 2.30) at a Dutch university participated in the study. 
Chinese students received €5 for their participation and Dutch students obtained 
course credits for their participation. The study had a 2 (cultural group: Dutch 
vs. Chinese) X 2 (injustice: individual vs. group) between subjects design (21-26 
participants per cell).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to an individual injustice condition or a 
group injustice condition. In the individual injustice condition, participants had 
to perform a set of tasks alone. In the group injustice condition, participants had 
to perform these tasks with two other persons from the same cultural group. In 
this experiment we used an injustice manipulation in which participants were 
deprived of a monetary reward.
Upon arrival at the lab, participants were told that the goal of the experiment 
was to compare people’s performance on two cognitive tasks. In the individual 
injustice condition, participants arrived in the lab individually and they were led 
to believe that they would be given two computer tasks and that their perfor-
mance on these tasks would be compared to that of a (fictitious) person who was 
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in another room. In the group condition, participants arrived in the lab with two 
other participants from the same cultural group (i.e., Dutch or Chinese). They 
were led to believe that they would work as a team on the same two computer 
tasks against another (fictitious) team of three persons that was in another room. 
Prior to the explanation of the experimental procedure, we checked whether 
participants knew each other and (if not) asked them to introduce themselves 
to each other (e.g., place of residence, discipline, year of study) as they would be 
working as a team. Following this, the various computer tasks were explained. 
Participants were told that the scores on the separate computer tasks would be 
added up to form their final score. In the individual injustice condition, they were 
told that this score would be compared to the score of the other person at the 
other location. In the group condition, they were told that the scores of all team 
members would be added up to form their final team score and that this total 
score would be compared to the final score of the other team. Participants in the 
individual condition were informed that the person with the highest score would 
receive €10. Participants in the group condition were told that the team with the 
total highest score would get €10 per person. Thus, they had to work together as 
a team to get this reward.
Participants were then led to single cubicles to work on two short computer 
tasks. These computer tasks were similar to a number-naming Stroop-test (i.e., 
naming the number of similar words that are projected while attempting to ignore 
the meaning of the words) and a color-naming Stroop-test (i.e., naming the color 
in which a word is projected while attempting to ignore the meaning of the word), 
respectively. After finishing the computer tasks participants read on the computer 
screen that they or their team had the best score and that they would get the mon-
etary reward. Subsequently, injustice was manipulated: the experimenter entered 
the cubicle to announce that she had just received a call from her colleague who 
had told her that the procedure had changed and that the other person (individual 
condition) or team (group condition) would be given the money instead. The 
experimenter told participants that she did not know the reason for this change 
of procedure.
Participants were then asked to complete two questionnaires. First, they filled 
out the questionnaire that pertained to the dependent variables. The second ques-
tionnaire was presented as a separate study. Participants were led to believe that 
this questionnaire concerned an evaluation of all lab experiments at the university, 
to check whether researchers complied with the codes of conduct for conducting 
research. The real purpose of this questionnaire, however, was to check whether 
participants perceived the procedural manipulation as unfair and how they felt 
about being deprived of the money that they were entitled to. After completing 
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the questionnaires, the participants left the cubicles and were thoroughly debriefed 
and thanked for their participation.
Measures
To check whether Dutch participants defined themselves as more independent 
and whether Chinese participants defined themselves as more interdependent, 
the Singelis Self-Construal scale (1994) was administered. Independent and 
interdependent self-construal were measured with 12 items each, and these could 
be answered using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Cronbach’s alpha for the independent subscale was .49 for Dutch participants and 
.62 for Chinese participants. Cronbach’s alpha for the interdependent subscale 
was .63 for the Dutch participants and .59 for the Chinese participants.
The main dependent variables were participants’ feelings of anger and disap-
pointment, both in general and related to the procedural injustice manipulation. 
All responses were given on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree).
To measure general feelings of anger, participants were asked to indicate to what 
extent they felt annoyed, angry, mad and furious. These items were integrated into 
an ‘anger’ scale. Cronbach’s α for this scale was .85 for Dutch and .80 for Chinese. 
Participants were also asked to indicate how angry and irritated they felt about the 
reward allocation. Pearson’s correlation between these items was .70 (p < .001) for 
Dutch participants and .78 (p < .001) for Chinese participants. These items were 
therefore combined into an ‘anger about reward allocation’ scale.
Participants were also asked to indicate on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 
7 = strongly agree) to what extent they felt disappointed and frustrated. The corre-
lation between these two items was .82 (p < .001) for Dutch participants and .55 
(p < .001) for Chinese participants. These two items produced a ‘disappointment’ 
scale. They were also asked to what extent they felt disappointed and frustrated 
about the reward allocation. These two items were also combined into a ‘disap-
pointment about reward allocation’ scale. Pearson’s correlation was .55, p < .001 for 
Dutch and .63, p <.001 for Chinese participants.
Finally, we checked how participants felt they were treated by the researchers and 
how they evaluated the procedure. For this, they were asked one question about 
how partial the researchers were (“To what extent were the researchers partial?”) 
and two questions about how the researchers treated them (“To what extent did 
the researchers treat you politely?” and “To what extent did the researchers treat 
you respectfully?”). Pearson’s correlation between these two items was .83 (p < 
.001) for Dutch participants and .54 (p < .001) for Chinese participants. We also 
asked participants the following four questions about the experimental procedure: 
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“To what extent was the experiment conducted in an honest way?”, “To what 
extent was the experiment conducted fairly?”, “To what extent was the way in 
which you have been rewarded for taking part in this experiment just?” and “To 
what extent was the procedure used to allocate money in this experiment just?”. 
These four items were combined to form a ‘judgement about procedure’ scale. All 
these questions could be answered using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .86 for Dutch participants and .76 for 
Chinese participants.
rESulTS
Descriptives and manipulation check
We checked whether Dutch participants defined themselves as more independent 
and whether Chinese participants defined themselves as more interdependent. A 
paired samples t-test revealed significantly higher scores for Dutch participants 
on the independent self-construal scale (M = 4.84, SD = 0.54) than on the inter-
dependent self-construal scale (M = 4.61, SD = 0.59), t(47) = 2.03, p = .048. In 
contrast, Chinese participants scored significantly higher on the interdependent 
self-construal scale (M = 5.01, SD = 0.69) than on the independent self-construal 
scale (M = 4.53, SD = 0.60), t(42) = -4.02, p < .001. We also compared whether 
Dutch and Chinese participants differed on both self-construal scales. This 
analysis revealed that Dutch participants scored higher on the independent self-
construal scale than Chinese participants, t(89) = 2.39, p = .019, whereas Chinese 
participants scored higher on the interdependent self-construal scale than Dutch 
participants, t(90) = 3.32, p = .001.
We checked whether Dutch and Chinese participants differed in their evalua-
tion of how fair the experiment was, how partial they thought the researchers were 
and with how much respect the researchers had treated them. A two-way ANOVA 
revealed that Chinese participants perceived the procedure of the experiment to 
be more fair (M = 4.94, SD = 1.17) than Dutch participants (M = 4.30, SD = 
1.46), F(1, 88) = 5.00, p = .03, η2 = .054. Participants in the individual injustice 
condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.48) and group injustice condition (M = 4.67, SD = 
1.26) did not differ in their perceptions of fairness, F(1, 88) = .39, p = .53, η2 = 
.00. There was also no interaction between culture and injustice condition, F(1, 
88) = 1.14, p = .29, η2 =.01. Remarkably, Chinese participants also found the 
researchers to be more partial (M = 4.14, SD = 2.17) than Dutch participants, M 
= 2.58, SD = 1.72, F(1, 87) = 14.17, p < .001, η2 = .140. This did not depend 
on whether the injustice targeted them individually (M = 3.36, SD = 2.08) or as 
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a group (M = 3.29, SD = 2.11, F(1, 87) = .02, p = .88, η2 = .00), and there was 
no interaction between cultural group and injustice condition, F(1, 87) = .01, p 
= .91, η2 = .00. Furthermore, Chinese participants (M = 6.45, SD = 0.86) did 
not differ from Dutch participants (M = 6.64, SD = 0.52) in the extent to which 
they were treated with respect by the researchers, F(1, 88) = 1.63, p = .21, η2 = 
.02. This did not depend on the type of injustice condition (individual-based 
or group-based), F(1, 88) = 1.71, p = .19, η2 = .02, nor was there an interaction 
between cultural group and injustice condition for respectful treatment, F(1, 88) 
= 0.17, p = .68, η2 = .00. Given the differences between the samples in people’s 
judgement about the fairness of the experimental procedure and the partiality of 
the researchers, we included these variables as covariates in our main analyses.
Culture, injustice, and feelings of  anger
To examine whether the two samples responded differently to group-based or 
individual-based injustice, we conducted a set of two-way ANCOVAs with cul-
tural group and injustice condition as the independent variables, and feelings of 
anger in general and anger about the reward allocation as the outcome variables. 
We simultaneously included judgement about the procedure and partiality of the 
researchers as the covariates. We obtained significant effects for judgement about 
the procedure in all these analyses, but not for partiality. In the results that are 
reported below, we only controlled for procedural judgement, unless otherwise 
reported. An overview of the unadjusted means can be found in Table 3.1.
We found that Chinese participants reported more anger (M = 2.49, SD = 1.19) 
than Dutch participants (M = 2.02, SD = 1.12), F(1, 85) = 9.62, p = .003, ηp2 = 
.102. Feelings of anger did not depend on whether the injustice targeted people 
individually (M = 2.16, SD = 1.18) or as a group (M = 2.33, SD = 1.17), F(1, 
85) = 1.24, p = .27, ηp2 = .01. Along with this, we found no interaction between 
cultural group and injustice condition for anger, F(1, 85 = 0.21, p = .65, ηp2 = .00.
When it comes to reported feelings of anger that involved the reward allocation, 
we found no differences between Dutch (M = 2.96, SD = 1.61) and Chinese 
participants (M = 2.88 SD = 1.61) in how angry they felt, F(1, 83) = 0.07, p = 
.80, ηp2 = .00), and these feelings also did not depend on whether the injustice 
was targeted at the group (M = 2.94, SD = 1.61) or the individual (M = 2.90, SD 
= 1.61), F(1, 83) = 0.15, p = .70, ηp2 = .00. We also found no interaction between 
cultural group and injustice condition for feelings of anger toward the reward 
allocation, F(1, 83) = 0.00, p = .94, ηp2 = .00.
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Table 3.1. Means for emotional responses across injustice conditions, for each cultural 
group (standard deviations between parentheses) 
Dutch Chinese
Individual Group Individual Group
Anger 1.83 (1.06) 2.19 (1.16) 2.59 (1.21) 2.48 (1.18)
Anger (reward) 2.91 (1.72) 3.00 (1.54) 2.90 (1.54) 2.87 (1.71)
Disappointment 2.61 (1.74) 2.98 (1.62) 2.95 (1.50) 2.70 (1.68)
Disappointment (reward) 3.32 (1.63) 3.38 (1.63) 4.08 (1.53) 2.78 (1.64)
Culture, injustice, and feelings of  disappointment
The effect of cultural group and injustice on feelings of disappointment was again 
examined by means of a set of two-way ANCOVAs, in which judgment about the 
procedure and partiality of the researchers were simultaneously included as covari-
ates. Again, the analyses revealed only significant effects for judgement about the 
procedure but not for partiality (which was removed from the analyses).
We found no differences between Dutch (M = 2.81, SD = 1.67) and Chinese 
participants (M = 2.81, SD = 1.59) in their feelings of disappointment, F(1, 84) 
= 0.16, p = .69, ηp2 = .00. These feelings also did not depend on whether injustice 
targeted them personally (M = 2.77, SD = 1.62) or as a group, M = 2.84, SD = 
1.64, F(1, 84) = 0.35, p = .56, ηp2 = .00. There was also no interaction between 
cultural group and injustice condition, F(1, 84) = 0.19, p = .67, ηp2 = .01.
We also found no differences between Dutch (M = 3.35, SD = 1.61) and Chi-
nese participants (M = 3.38, SD = 1.70) in how disappointed they were about the 
reward allocation, F(1, 84) = 0.19, p = .67, ηp2 = .00. There was no main effect of 
the injustice condition either, F(1, 84) = 2.50, p = .12, ηp2 = .03, and there was 
no interaction between cultural group and injustice condition, F(1, 84) = 2.71, p 
= .10, ηp2 = .03.
Independent self  and interdependent self  as moderators 
Finally, we conducted an additional set of analyses to examine whether people’s 
self-construal would moderate cultural differences in reported emotions (anger, 
anger about the reward allocation, disappointment and disappointment about the 
reward allocation). For this purpose, we conducted moderation analyses, using 
PROCESS (model 1; Hayes, 2013), with independent self-construal and interde-
pendent self-construal as moderators and both judgement about the procedure and 
injustice condition as the covariates. We obtained significant effects for judgement 
about the procedure in all these analyses, but not for injustice condition. In the 
results that are reported below, we only controlled for procedural judgement. The 
analysis was performed with 5000 bootstrapping samples and 95% bias-corrected 
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and accelerated confidence intervals to evaluate indirect effects. With regard to the 
moderating role of participants’ independent self, the analyses revealed no main 
effects for cultural group or independent self-construal and no interaction between 
these variables (Bs < 1.34, ps > .20) for all four emotions. As for the moderating 
role of participants’ interdependent self in their emotional responses to injustice, 
we found a main effect of cultural group (B = 6.27, SE = 2.47, t(87) = 2.54, p = 
.013) on disappointment, indicating that Chinese participants were more disap-
pointed than Dutch participants. We also found a main effect of interdependent 
self-construal, indicating that participants who had a more interdependent self-
construal were more disappointed than those who were less interdependent, B 
= .92, SE = 0.35, t(87) = 2.61, p = .011. Furthermore, there was an interaction 
between cultural group and interdependent self-construal, B = -1.27, SE = .51, 
t(87) = -2.49, p = .015. An inspection of this interaction revealed that Dutch 
participants with a more interdependent self (+ 1 SD) were more disappointed 
than those with a less interdependent self (B = .95, SE = .35, p = .009). For 
Chinese participants, no differences were found between those high and low in 
interdependence in how disappointed they were (B = -0.34, SE = .36, p = .36).
dISCuSSION 
In the past years, there has been a debate about how people’s self-construal may 
affect their responses to (in)justice. Whereas some researchers have suggested that 
negative reactions to injustice stem from concerns about the social self, others 
have argued that such reactions may (at least in some situations) also be shaped 
by concerns about the individual self (e.g., Brockner, De Cremer, Van den Bos, 
& Chen, 2005; Van Prooijen & Zwenk, 2009). So far, however, most research in 
this area has been limited to within-culture comparisons and much less is known 
about possible cross-cultural differences in this regard. In this study, we investi-
gated how people from individualistic or collectivistic backgrounds respond to an 
unfair procedure, and whether their responses also vary as a function of whether 
the injustice targets them personally or as a group.
Overall, our findings provide more support for the idea that negative reactions 
to injustice stem from concerns about the interdependent or social self. For ex-
ample, we found that Chinese participants reported more anger following the 
injustice manipulation than Dutch participants. We also found that they were 
more disappointed than Dutch participants, be it that Dutch participants with a 
more interdependent self were more disappointed than those with a less interde-
pendent self. We did not find that the emotional responses of Dutch and Chinese 
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participants were moderated by the extent to which they defined themselves as 
independent. These findings suggest that it is the interdependent self that is more 
sensitive to (un)fair procedures, possibly because such procedures signal relevant 
information about the quality of people’s interactions with others or their con-
nectedness with the social environment. Of particular relevance in this regard is 
that Chinese participants found the procedure to be more fair, but also considered 
the experimenter to be more partial, suggesting that relational concerns may in-
deed have played a more important role for them (albeit that this did not directly 
affect their emotional responses).
Our findings contrast with previous research by Van Prooijen and Zwenk (2009) 
and Van den Bos and colleagues (2011), who found that when the individual (in-
dependent) self was activated people responded more negatively to injustice (vs. 
justice) than when the social (interdependent) self was activated. It is important 
to note, however, that their studies differ in a number of important ways from 
our study. For example, both Van Prooijen and Zwenk (2009) and Van den Bos 
and colleagues (2011) focused on differences in reactions to fair versus unfair 
procedures among individuals whose independent or interdependent self was ac-
tivated. But in our study, we were primarily interested in whether and how people 
with interdependent (collectivistic) or independent (individualistic) backgrounds 
differ in how they respond to injustice. It is also possible that concerns about the 
independent or interdependent self depend on the type of injustice. For example, 
Van Prooijen and Zwenk measured reactions following a so-called voice procedure 
(versus a no-voice procedure), in which participants were asked to provide input 
in a decision-making process. Such procedures are more likely to validate people’s 
individual attributes and hence activate the individual self than the procedure that 
we used in this study, in which participants were deprived of a monetary reward.
Interestingly, we found that Chinese and Dutch participants did not differ in 
how they responded to injustice that targeted them as an individual or as a group. 
This finding runs counter to the idea that injustice that targets a group should 
be particularly threatening to people with collectivistic backgrounds, because 
they are more likely to feel connected to their social environment and to use 
the group to define and evaluate themselves (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Van den Bos, Veldhuizen, Au, 2015). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in 
mind that participants in the group injustice condition were solely assigned to 
a group on the basis of their nationality and did not have the opportunity to 
interact with each other during the task or to get to know each other better. It 
is possible that simply being assigned to a group may not be enough for people 
with collectivistic backgrounds to establish a sense of connectedness or to elicit 
a group-based response (e.g., Brewer & Chen, 2007; Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, & 
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Takemura, 2005; Yuki & Takemura, 2014). Furthermore, it is important to note 
that the group injustice manipulation that we used not only targeted the group 
but also targeted the participants themselves. As such, it could have posed a threat 
to both the independent and the interdependent self.
A limitation of this study is that we only compared two cultural groups and 
that our sample sizes were relatively small, which makes it more difficult to draw 
firm conclusions about cultural differences (or similarities) in people’s emotional 
responses to injustice. We also did not include a control group (no injustice ma-
nipulation), which arguably makes it somewhat harder to compare our findings 
with previous studies that focused on procedural fairness effects. It is also impor-
tant to note that our injustice manipulation occurred in an artificial setting and 
that injustice that occurs in real life (e.g., being deprived of resources such as 
housing, social services, or job that the great majority of society enjoys) may elicit 
stronger or different emotional reactions (e.g., sadness). We also recommend that 
future research compares more systematically whether and how different types of 
injustice may affect people’s reactions.
Nevertheless, with this study we have contributed to current theorizing and 
research on the role of the independent versus interdependent self in shaping 
people’s responses to injustice, by examining this from a cross-cultural perspec-
tive. We included instances of group injustice in our study together with instances 
of personal injustice, as the former has received relatively little attention in justice 
research. Our findings provide more support for the idea that people’s reactions 
to injustice are shaped by concerns about the interdependent self, but more cross-
cultural studies are needed to examine this in more depth and across a wider range 
of samples and situations.

Chapter 4
Cross-cultural similarities and differences in motives to 
forgive: A comparison between and within cultures
This chapter is based on: 
Huwaë, S., & Schaafsma, J.(2017). Cross-cultural similarities and differences in 
motives to forgive: A comparison between and within cultures. 
International Journal of Psychology.DOI: 10.1002/ijop.12461
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An inevitable part of social life is that we are sometimes confronted with people 
who treat us unfairly, violate our social or moral norms, or hurt our feelings. People 
can respond differently when this happens. While some may be motivated to seek 
revenge or cut off their relations with those who have offended them, others may 
decide to forgive the offender. Research has shown that people can have differ-
ent motives to forgive those who have hurt or offended them (e.g., Baumeister, 
Exline, & Sommer, 1998; Exline, Worthington, Hill, & McCullough, 2003). For 
example, they may forgive out of concern for themselves (e.g., because they want 
to let go of the hurt they are experiencing), out of concern for the offender (e.g., 
because they feel compassion for this person), or out of concern for their relation-
ship with the offender (e.g., because they want to maintain a good relationship 
with this person) (Strelan, McKee, Calic, Cook, & Shaw, 2013). In the present 
study we examine these forgiveness motives through a cross-cultural lens.
In the past years, cross-cultural researchers have started to consider the pos-
sibility that people’s motives to forgive may differ across cultures (e.g., Ballester, 
Chatri, Sastre, Rivière, & Mullet, 2011; Suwartono, Prawasti, & Mullet, 2007). 
More specifically, researchers have proposed that forgiveness motives may vary as 
a function of whether cultures are more individualistic or collectivistic. For ex-
ample, Sandage and Williamson (2005) have argued that in collectivistic cultures, 
people may be primarily motivated to forgive out of concern for others (so-called 
relationship motives and offender-focused motives) because in such cultures, 
people value maintaining harmony with group members and attach importance 
to their well-being. Conversely, people from individualistic cultures may be more 
motivated to forgive out of concern for the self (so-called self-focused motives), 
because they tend to value autonomy and attach more importance to their own 
well-being.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether people in individualistic cultures will 
be primarily concerned with the self and whether concerns about others prevail in 
more collectivistic cultures. For example, Fischer and Schwartz (2011) examined 
in a series of studies among a wide range of different countries to what extent 
people across these countries differed in their emphasis on values associated with 
autonomy and relatedness and to what extent individuals within countries shared 
these values. Using data from different cross-national databases (e.g., the World 
Value Survey), they found that values linked to autonomy and relatedness varied 
much more between individuals than between countries. These findings call into 
question the idea that values that involve a concern for the self (e.g., autonomy) 
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should be typical of individualistic cultures and those that involve a concern for 
others (e.g., relatedness) should be characteristic of collectivistic cultures.
If cultures differ less in values such as autonomy and relatedness than what has 
generally been assumed, then it is possible that people in individualistic cultures 
may also be concerned about the relationship with the offender following an inter-
personal conflict and thus be motivated to forgive for the sake of the relationship 
as well. This is also in line with the idea that maintaining positive relationships is 
a universal need (e.g., Schwartz, 1992), because having social ties is important to 
get things done and to receive care, protection or support of any kind (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995). Nevertheless, there is also reason to believe that people in indi-
vidualistic cultures may rely on a smaller number of close relationship partners 
(Karremans et al., 2011; Schwartz, 1990). This could imply that they may be 
particularly likely to forgive these close others for the sake of the relationship, 
because they may be motivated to preserve those relations. In support of this idea, 
Strelan and colleagues (2013) found in Australia (a country that is considered to 
be more individualistic) that people who had experienced transgressions in close 
relationships were not only inclined to forgive out of concern for the self, but also 
because they wanted to maintain their relationship with the offender.
The findings of Fischer and Schwartz (2011) could further imply that people 
in collectivistic cultures may focus on the self as well following an interpersonal 
conflict, and hence forgive out of concern for the self too. Thus, although in such 
cultures people may generally value interconnectedness and harmonious relation-
ships with others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), they may also be motivated to let 
go of unpleasant feelings and reduce stress following a conflict as this may improve 
their emotional and cognitive well-being (e.g., Black, 2006; Witvliet, Ludwig, & 
Van der Laan, 2001). In support of this idea, there is indeed some evidence that 
suggests that people from collectivistic cultures may forgive not only out of concern 
for the relationship but out of concern for the self as well. A case in point is a study 
of Takada and Ohbuchi (2004) that was conducted among Japanese students. In 
this study, participants were asked to recall interpersonal episodes during which 
someone had harmed them and to rate their motives to forgive as well as how close 
their relationship was with the offender. The researchers found that motives involv-
ing both concern for the self (e.g., avoiding unpleasant feelings and maintaining 
a positive self-image) and concern for others (e.g., sympathy for the offender and 
maintaining a relationship with the offender) affected Japanese participants’ mo-
tives to forgive, especially when the offender was someone they felt close to.
At present, however, we still know very little about whether and how people from 
more collectivistic or more individualistic cultures differ in the extent to which 
they endorse relationship motives, offender-focused motives and self-focused 
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motives. Only a few studies have compared forgiveness motives across cultures 
(e.g., Ballester et al., 2011; Suwartono et al., 2007) and these have not systemati-
cally examined to what extent motives that reflect a concern for the self, for the 
relationship and for the offender may vary both within and across cultures. Such 
comparisons are important, however, given that some of the studies mentioned 
above suggest that there may be more similarities in these motives than what is 
often assumed in cross-cultural research.
The aim of the present study is to address this and to examine whether the 
prevalence of different forgiveness motives is relatively similar across cultures or 
whether other-focused motives are more prevalent in collectivistic cultures and 
self-focused motives in individualistic cultures (as one would predict from an 
individualism-collectivism framework). For this purpose, we conducted a study 
in the Netherlands and in the archipelago ‘the Moluccas’ in Indonesia. Previous 
studies have shown that the Netherlands is relatively high on individualism and 
that Indonesia is relatively high on collectivism (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Oyserman, 
Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). In the Netherlands people also tend to prefer a 
loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of 
themselves and their immediate families only (Hofstede, Minkov, & Hofstede, 
2014). By contrast, people in the Moluccas tend to rely strongly on a broad social 
network (including co-villagers) for care, protection and support (Von Benda-
Beckmann, 2015).
In line with previous studies on forgiveness motives (e.g., Karremans, Van 
Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Kluwer, 2003), participants in this study were asked to 
recall a conflict whereby they had forgiven the other and they were asked to indi-
cate why they had decided to forgive this person. We examined whether motives 
that focused on the self, the offender and on the relationship varied across the two 
cultures and we also examined the relative importance of these motives within 
these cultures. Given that people’s motives to forgive may also depend on how 
close they are with their offender (e.g., Strelan et al., 2013; Takada & Ohbuchi, 
2004), we examined whether the relative importance of these motives varied as a 
function of relationship closeness.
METhOd
Participants and design
A total of 112 participants from the Netherlands and the archipelago ‘the Mo-
luccas’ (Indonesia) participated in the study. The Moluccan participants were 
inhabitants from the Isle of Ambon, which is part of the Moluccas. This island was 
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selected because of our networks on this island, which facilitated data collection. 
Participants in the Moluccas were recruited door-to-door in different villages by 
local research assistants. In the Netherlands, they were recruited within the social 
networks of research assistants. Given that this study only focused on people who 
had forgiven the offender, we excluded participants who indicated they had not 
forgiven the offender. This left us with a final sample of 92 participants. This 
sample consisted of 48 Moluccan (19 men, 29 women; Mage = 31.55, SD = 11.00) 
and 44 Dutch participants (25 men, 19 women; Mage = 35.48, SD = 14.35). Of the 
Moluccan participants, 14.9% had a low educational level, 66% had a medium 
educational level and 19.1% had a high educational level. Of the Dutch partici-
pants, 7.3% had a low, 61% a medium, and 31.7% a high educational level.
Procedure
Participants were asked to participate in a study on conflicts and forgiveness in 
daily life. They received an envelope that included a questionnaire. All research 
assistants agreed with the participants on a time about when to collect the com-
pleted questionnaire. As an introduction to the questionnaire, participants read 
that the purpose of the study was to examine how people deal with conflicts in 
their daily lives. They were asked to recall a severe conflict (i.e., a conflict that they 
could not easily forget) whereby they had forgiven the offender.
The recall task that was given to participants was based on the instructions 
of Karremans and colleagues (2003) and read as follows: “Every now and then, 
people have conflicts with someone. A conflict can be relatively mild (for example, 
a conflict that you easily forget), but it can also be severe (for example a conflict 
that you do not easily forget). We ask you to think about a severe conflict (which 
is a conflict that you do not easily forget) whereby you have forgiven the other 
person.” In the close offender condition, participants then read: “This person was 
someone with whom you have or had a close relationship (for example a friend, 
parent, sibling, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, husband, wife, intimate partner)”. 
In the non-close offender condition, participants read: “This person was someone 
that you did not know that well or not at all (for example an acquaintance, a 
neighbor, a student, a co-worker, a manager, a salesman, a stranger, etcetera)”. 
Participants were then asked to think about a conflict for which the other person 
was to blame. It did not matter how long ago this conflict happened. Participants 
were instructed to take their time to recall this conflict and were informed that 
they did not have to describe the conflict.
Prior to the recall task, participants completed a questionnaire that assessed 
their personal background. After the recall task they were asked a number of 
questions about the conflict. Moluccan participants completed the questionnaire 
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in Indonesian whereas Dutch participants completed it in Dutch. Given that the 
majority of scale items in the questionnaire was originally written in English, the 
questionnaire was first translated from English into Indonesian and Dutch, and 
then back translated into English to check differences in interpretation. Translation 
from English into Indonesian was performed by two Indonesian native speakers 
and back translation from Indonesian into Dutch and English was performed by 
a translation service of an Indonesian university. We then checked whether the 
Dutch and Indonesian translation matched the English version. Given that the 
inhabitants on the Isle of Ambon use a local vocabulary and may not fully un-
derstand the translated questionnaire in Indonesian, the questionnaire was then 
adjusted to the Ambonese vocabulary. We also checked whether the Ambonese 
version of the questionnaire matched the Dutch one, which was indeed the case.
Measures
We checked to what extent people perceived themselves as more independent 
(which should be valued in more individualistic cultures) or interdependent 
(which should be emphasized in more collectivistic cultures). For this, we used 
a modified version of the Inclusion of Other in the Self scale (Swann, Gómez, 
Seyle, Morales, & Huici, 2009) that was originally developed by Aron, Aron and 
Smollan (1992). This is a single-item pictorial scale that measures people’s sense of 
being interconnected with others and has been successfully used in cross-cultural 
research to examine how people define themselves in relation to others (e.g., Li, 
2002). The modified version that we used consists of five pairs of circles that differ 
in their level of overlap between Self and Other, varying from no overlap (Other 
excluded from Self ) to maximal overlap (Other included in Self ). Participants 
were instructed to indicate which of these circle pairs best represented their rela-
tionship with others. The first circle was labeled as ‘1’, which means that people 
do not include others in the self and indicates a more independent self. The fifth 
circle was labeled as ‘5’, which means that there is a complete overlap with others, 
indicating that people have a more interdependent self.1
To obtain more insight into the circumstances of the conflict that participants 
recalled, they were asked to specify how long ago the conflict took place, how hurt 
they felt when the conflict happened (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely), what type 
of relationship they had with the offender (e.g., parent, stranger), how close they 
were with the offender before the conflict (1 = not close at all, 5 = very close), 
1 The questionnaire also contained the Horizontal and Vertical Individualism-Collectivism scale 
(Triandis & Gelfland, 1998). Nevertheless, the Cronbach’s alpha of the subscales were very low to 
moderate for both samples (alpha’s were between .13 and .75 for Dutch and between .17 and .53 for 
Moluccans). Because of the low alpha’s, we decided not to include this scale in the analyses.
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whether the offender asked for forgiveness (1 = not at all, 5 = very much), and to 
what extent they had forgiven the offender (1 = not at all, 5 = completely).
The main dependent variables were participants’ motives to forgive. To assess 
this, we used the Focus of Forgiveness scale developed by Strelan and colleagues 
(2013). This scale assesses self-, offender- and relationship-focused motives to 
forgive and presents participants with a series of items that start with the tag: 
“I forgave because...”. The self-focus scale consists of five items (e.g., it seemed to 
be a way to stop myself hurting”, “to help myself get over what happened”). The 
offender-focus scale consists of four items (e.g., “I really felt for the other person”, 
“despite what he/she did, I didn’t want the other person to hurt”). The relationship 
scale also contains five items (e.g., “not forgiving would risk the relationship”, “I 
wanted to maintain a good relationship”). All ratings were made using 5-point 
scales with endpoints labeled 1 (totally disagree) and 5 (totally agree). Cronbach’s 
alpha for the self-focus scale was .66 for Moluccans and .74 for Dutch. Cronbach’s 
alpha for the offender-focus scale was .67 for Moluccans and .78 for Dutch and for 
the relationship scale Cronbach’s alpha was .48 for Moluccans and .86 for Dutch.
rESulTS
Descriptives 
First, we examined to what extent people from the Netherlands and the Moluccas 
defined themselves as more independent or interdependent, using the Inclusion 
of Others in the Self scale. An independent samples t-test showed that Moluccan 
participants defined themselves as more interdependent (M = 4.46, SD = 0.86) 
than Dutch participants (M = 3.60, SD = 0.88), t(87) = 4.62, p < .001.
We also examined whether the conflicts that Moluccan and Dutch participants 
described were different or similar on a number of dimensions: how long ago 
the conflict took place, how hurt they felt during the conflict, to what extent the 
offender asked for forgiveness and how close they were with the offender before 
the conflict. An overview of the means can be found in Table 4.1. The conflicts 
that Moluccans described had taken place more recently than the conflicts that 
Dutch participants described, t(70.12) = -2.31, p = .024. Moluccans also felt more 
hurt during the conflict, t(90) = 2.58, p = .012, and they reported more closeness 
with the offender before the conflict than Dutch participants, t(90) = 3.09, p = 
.003. They also more often reported that the offender had asked for forgiveness 
than Dutch participants, t(74.91) = 4.63, p < .001.
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Table 4.1. Means and standard deviations for the descriptives
Moluccan Dutch
M SD M SD
Time since conflict (years) 1.84 2.55 2.65 3.72
Hurt feelings 4.02 1.08 3.45 1.02
Closeness before conflict 4.12 1.18 3.34 1.26
Offender asking forgiveness 3.33 1.69 2.02 0.94
We calculated the correlations (see Table 4.2) between the three forgiveness mo-
tives within the Dutch and Moluccan sample as well. In the Moluccan sample, the 
three motives were positively correlated with each other, rs > .51, ps < .001. In the 
Dutch sample, offender-focused motives were positively correlated with the self-
focused motives (r = .33, p = .029) and the relationship motives (r = .55, p < .001).
Table 4.2. Means, standard deviations and correlations for forgiveness motives 
Moluccan Dutch
1 2 3M SD M SD
Self 4.16** 0.49 3.01a 0.79 .33* .14
Offender 3.98 0.57 2.64b 0.95 .54** .55**
Relationship 4.07*** 0.46 3.59c 0.83 .56** .52**
Note. Means within the same column that do not share a subscript differ at p < .05 or beyond. An 
asterix represents a significant difference between cultural groups. Correlations above the diagonal refer 
to Dutch participants.
*p < .05 **p < .01 *** p < .001
Between-cultural differences in forgiveness motives
Before conducting the main analyses, we checked whether participants in the 
close offender condition recalled a conflict with someone they felt close to prior to 
the conflict and whether those in the non-close condition thought about someone 
they did not feel (very) close to. We found that part of the participants (N = 26) 
in the non-close offender condition recalled a conflict with someone they felt 
close or very close to prior to the conflict. Furthermore, some of the participants 
(N = 3) in the close offender condition remembered a conflict with someone they 
did not feel close to. For this reason, we decided to conduct the analyses with 
relationship closeness prior to the conflict as the moderator instead of the offender 
condition (close vs. non-close).
We conducted separate analyses for each of the three motives (self-focused 
motives, offender-focused motives and relationship motives), using PROCESS 
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(model 1; Hayes, 2013), with 5000 bootstrapping samples and 95% bias-corrected 
and accelerated confidence intervals. In a first set of analyses, we examined the 
effects of cultural group (0 = Moluccan, 1 = Dutch), relationship closeness and 
their interaction on the three forgiveness motives. The means for these analyses 
can be found in Table 4.2. Given that there were differences between the samples 
in how long ago the conflict took place, the extent to which participants felt 
hurt, and the extent to which offenders asked for forgiveness, we also performed 
additional analyses in which we controlled for these variables. In these analyses, 
we controlled for gender and age as well.
The analysis for the relationship motives revealed that Moluccan participants 
endorsed such motives more than Dutch participants, B = -1.34, SE = .40, p = 
.001. There was no significant effect of relationship closeness (p = .22), but there 
was a significant interaction between cultural group and relationship closeness, 
B = .28, SE = .10, p = .008, respectively. For Moluccan participants, relationship 
closeness did not affect the extent to which they endorsed relationship motives, B 
= .09, SE, = .07, p = .22. Dutch participants, however, were more likely to endorse 
relationship motives when they felt more close to the offender, B = .37, SE = .07, p 
< .001 (see Figure 4.1). Controlling for the covariates did not change this pattern 
of results and only one covariate (age) was significant, B = -.02, SE = .01, p = .004.
Figure 4.1. Relationship between relationship motives and relationship closeness for Mo-
luccans and dutch.
Moluccan participants also endorsed offender-focused motives more than Dutch 
participants, B = -2.20, SE = .50, p < .001. Nevertheless, this was qualified by a 
significant interaction between cultural group and relationship closeness, B = .27, 
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SE = .13, p = .035 (see Figure 4.2). An inspection of this interaction revealed that 
for Moluccan participants, their relationship with the offender did not impact 
the extent to which they endorsed offender-focused motives, B = .06, SE = .09, p 
= .54. Yet, Dutch participants were more likely to report these motives when the 
offender was someone they felt close to, B = .33, SE = .09, p < .001. Additional 
analyses that included the covariates revealed that none of the covariates was 
significant at the .05 level (Bs < .12, ps > .09).
Figure 4.2. Relationship between offender-focused motives and relationship closeness 
for Moluccans and dutch.
Finally, we found that Moluccan participants supported self-focused motives 
somewhat more than Dutch participants, B = -.85, SE = .45, p = .064. Neverthe-
less, we found that this difference (which did not reach conventional levels of 
significance) disappeared when we controlled for how hurt participants felt by the 
offender, B = .23, SE = .06, p < .001. No main effect was found of relationship 
closeness and there was also no interaction between cultural group and relationship 
closeness, B = .08, SE = .08, p = .35 and B = -.07, SE = .11, p = .54, respectively. 
See also Figure 4.3.2
2 We conducted an additional set of analyses for each of the forgiveness motives, in which we controlled 
for the alternative motives. For the offender-focused motives, the interaction between cultural group 
and relationship closeness was no longer significant (B = .16, p = .17) when the self- and relationship 
motives were added as covariates. For the relationship motives, the interaction between cultural group 
and relationship closeness changed into a trend (B = .18, p = .052) and the main effect of cultural 
group disappeared (B = -.57, p = .16) when offender-focused motives were added. For the self-focused 
motives, the coefficient of cultural group was meaningfully reduced when offender-focused motives 
were added (B = -.04, p = .93).
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Figure 4.3. Relationship between self-focused motives and relationship closeness for Mo-
luccans and dutch.
Within-cultural differences in forgiveness motives
We also examined how important the three forgiveness motives were within each 
cultural group. To this end, we conducted a mixed ANCOVA with motives to for-
give (self-focus, offender-focus, relationship) as the within-subjects factor, cultural 
group as the between-subjects factor, and relationship closeness as a covariate. The 
analysis revealed that the motives to forgive varied within cultures, F(2, 168) = 
16.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .17 (see Table 4.2). Interestingly, contrast analyses indicated 
that Dutch participants endorsed relationship motives more than self-focused and 
offender-focused motives, F(1, 85) = 21.86, p < .001, η2 = .205 and F(1, 85) = 
77.99, p < .001, η2 = .479, respectively. They did, however, endorse self-focused 
motives more than offender-focused motives, F(1, 85) = 9.22, p = .003, η2 = 
.098. For the Moluccans we found no differences in the relative importance of 
the three forgiveness motives, Fs < 2.35, ps > .13. Additional analyses in which we 
controlled for the covariates not change this pattern of results.
Additional analyses with Inclusion of  Others in the Self  as potential mediator
Finally, we conducted an additional set of analyses to examine whether the rela-
tionship between cultural group and relationship closeness on the one hand and 
forgiveness motives on the other was mediated by the extent to which participants 
defined themselves as more independent or more interdependent (using the Inclu-
sion of Others in the Self scale). For this purpose, we conducted a mediation 
analysis, using PROCESS (Model 8), with 5000 bootstrapping samples and 95% 
bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals to evaluate indirect effects. We 
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did not find any evidence, however, for the mediating role of Inclusion of Others 
in the Self for either the relationship motives (B = .01, SE = .02, 95% CI [ -.01, 
.07]), the offender-focused motives (B = .00, SE = .01, 95% CI [ -.01, .05]), or 
the self-focused motives (B = .00, SE = .01, 95% CI [ -.01, .05]).
dISCuSSION
In this study we examined cross-cultural differences and similarities in people’s 
motives to forgive. More specifically, we investigated whether forgiveness motives 
that involve a concern for others are more important to people who live in a more 
collectivistic culture, and whether forgiveness motives that involve a concern for 
the self are more important to those who live in a more individualistic culture. 
Given that people’s motives to forgive may also vary as a function of how close 
they are with the offender, we included this factor in our study as well.
Our findings present a nuanced view on how people’s motives to forgive may 
differ across cultures. On the one hand, it was found that relationship motives and 
offender-focused motives were more important for Moluccan participants than for 
Dutch participants, which is in line with the idea that harmony and relatedness 
are important in collectivistic cultures (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These 
cultural differences in relationship motives and offender-focused motives were 
moderated by relationship closeness. For Moluccan participants, feelings of close-
ness to the offender did not affect their motives to forgive. Dutch participants, 
however, were more likely to endorse relationship and offender-focused motives 
with close others than with non-close others.
On the other hand, the differences that we found between the samples could not 
be explained by the extent to which people defined themselves as more indepen-
dent or interdependent (which we used as a proxy to assess more individualistic 
or collectivistic tendencies). In addition, our findings do not support the idea that 
in individualistic cultures, people are more motivated to forgive out of concern 
for the self than in collectivistic cultures (e.g., Sandage & Williamson, 2005). 
For example, we found that Moluccan and Dutch participants did not differ in 
the extent to which they endorsed self-focused motives, after controlling for how 
hurt they felt by the offender. Moreover, our within-culture comparisons showed 
that Dutch participants attached more importance to relationship motives than 
to self-focused motives, be it that they were more likely to forgive out of concern 
for the self than out of concern for the offender.
These findings call into question the idea that forgiveness motives that involve 
a concern for the self (personal well-being) should be particularly important to 
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people in individualistic cultures and that forgiveness motives that involve a con-
cern for others (harmonious relationships and well-being of the offender) should 
be more relevant in collectivistic cultures. Instead, our findings suggest that in 
more collectivistic cultures people may also be motivated to protect their own 
well-being following transgressions, particularly when they feel hurt by the of-
fender. This is in line with previous research by Takada and Ohbuchi (2004) who 
found that Japanese participants also endorsed self-focused forgiveness motives, 
and it is in line with the idea that protecting one’s own well-being in stressful 
situations may be a basic human motive (e.g., Black, 2006). Furthermore, our 
findings suggest that in more individualistic cultures people can be motivated to 
maintain harmonious relationships following transgressions as well, particularly 
with those who are close to them. This may reflect a universal need to belong, 
because having social ties is a basic necessity for people to achieve goals, to fulfill 
their tasks, or to feel protected (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Schwartz, 1992).
Interestingly, however, we did find that relationship closeness played a less 
important role in people’s motives to forgive in the Moluccan sample than in 
the Dutch sample. This finding is in line with recent studies that suggest that in 
collectivistic cultures, forgiveness may depend less on the nature of people’s rela-
tionship with the offender (e.g., Karremans et al., 2011). According to Karremans 
and colleagues, this is because social harmony is such an important norm in these 
cultures and because people are likely to have internalized these norms. In the 
Moluccas, the distinction between close and non-close others may also play a less 
prominent role in people’s motives to forgive because they tend to rely strongly on 
a broad social network (including co-villagers) for care, protection and support 
(Von Benda-Beckmann, 2015).
Yet, when interpreting the results several caveats have to be borne in mind 
as well. For example, we asked participants to recall a severe conflict and such 
a method may be prone to recall biases. Of particular importance here is that 
people’s responses may have been influenced by the outcome of the forgiveness 
process (e.g., that they felt less hurt), making it more difficult to adequately 
distinguish between forgiveness motives and forgiveness outcomes. Furthermore, 
we did not ask participants to specify the nature of the conflict. Yet, it is possible 
that there may be cultural differences in how people perceive a transgression or 
conflict, which may in turn also affect their motives to forgive (Ho & Fung, 
2011). In addition, it is possible that our Moluccan participants scored higher on 
the different motives to forgive because forgiveness is the norm in their culture, 
not because they actually experienced forgiveness in an emotional sense (e.g., 
Hook, Worthington, & Utsey, 2009). This is an issue that needs to be addressed 
in future studies as well. It is also important to keep in mind that our samples were 
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relatively small, so more studies should be done to see to what extent the present 
results can be generalized.
Nevertheless, this study is among the first to examine forgiveness motives 
through a cross-cultural lens and we believe that the current findings provide a 
meaningful contribution to present research and theorizing on this topic. Our 
findings suggest that, even though relationship and offender-focused motives 
are more strongly endorsed by people from collectivistic cultures than by people 
from individualistic cultures, the latter are not primarily guided by self-focused 
motives when they decide to forgive. Even though they tend to be less concerned 
about the offender than about the self, they are more motivated to forgive out of 
concern for the relationship than out of concern for the self, particularly when the 
offender is close to them. Our results also indicate that differences in the extent to 
which people endorse such motives cannot be explained by a more independent 
(individualistic) or interdependent (collectivistic) conception of self. Instead, the 
findings with respect to the role of relationship closeness point to the possibility 
that close-knittedness and average levels of interdependence within a community 
may be a more important determinant of people’s motives to forgive than indi-
vidual conceptions of self. Future studies should seek to examine in more depth 
whether and how the degree of interdependence within a community affects 
people’s motives to forgive those who have offended them.

Chapter 5
Motives to (not) forgive deviant group members: 
A comparison within and between cultures 
This chapter is based on: 
Huwaë, S., & Schaafsma, J.(under review). Motives to (not) forgive deviant 
group members: A comparison within and between cultures. 
Asian Journal of Social Psychology.
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As members of social groups, people can experience considerable distress when 
other group members violate important norms. Think for example of a church 
member who maliciously gossips about the pastor or a treasurer of a neighborhood 
association who uses public money for private holiday trips. Such transgressions 
may be stressful to group members and may also pose a threat to the identity of 
or cohesion in the group (e.g., Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008; Piff, Martinez, 
& Keltner, 2011). In this regard, several studies on transgressions within social 
groups have shown that people can perceive these transgressions as threatening 
to their self-image or their identity and that they may also result in unpleasant 
feelings such as shame or anger (e.g., Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Johns, 
Schmader, & Lickel, 2005).
When important group norms have been violated, people may or may not be 
motivated to forgive the deviant group member. At present, however, we know 
very little about these motives. Although researchers have begun to explore why 
people forgive (e.g., McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003; Strelan, McKee, 
Calic, Cook, & Shaw, 2013), they have generally considered forgiveness as an 
intra- or interpersonal process. From this perspective, people may forgive because 
it benefits the self, the offender, or their relationship. Yet, when norms have been 
violated by ingroup members, concerns about the group may become important 
as well, particularly because people identify with their groups (Biernat, Vescio, 
& Billings, 1999). For example, research on ingroup transgressions demonstrates 
that people can become hostile toward ingroup members who violate important 
group norms, because they want to protect the group from the threat that the 
ingroup deviant poses to their social identity (e.g., Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & 
Coleman, 1993). Such concerns about the group and the group’s identity could 
possibly motivate people to not forgive ingroup deviants for their actions.
In the present study, we set out to examine people’s motives to (not) forgive 
those who have violated an important cultural norm, and to explore whether (in 
addition to intrapersonal and interpersonal motives) concerns about the group 
(which we labeled ‘group’ motives) also play a role in this regard. For this purpose, 
we conducted a study in the Moluccan archipelago in Indonesia. One important 
feature of the Central and South Moluccas is an intervillage alliance system, called 
‘pela’, that aims to form, maintain or restore harmonious relationships between 
two or more villages (Bartels, 1977). Pela plays an important role in developing 
and sustaining a common ethnic identity in the Central and South Moluccas 
(e.g., Braüchler, 2009). A central norm within this alliance system is that pela 
members are not allowed to marry descendants from or inhabitants of an allied 
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village.3 We examined why people would or would not forgive group members 
who have violated this marital prohibition and how important group motives are 
in this regard, relative to motives that are focused on the self, the relationship, or 
the offender.
We also wanted to obtain a better understanding of how the cultural context 
may shape people’s responses to ingroup deviants. Based upon research on ingroup 
deviants and the black sheep effect (e.g., Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988), one 
could make the case that group motives may play a negative role in forgiveness 
processes when the group plays a central role in people’s lives (e.g., Hornsey, Jetten, 
McAuliffe, & Hogg, 2006). Along similar lines, it could be argued that such mo-
tives should be particularly important in settings that are more collectivistic, be-
cause complying with cultural norms and maintaining group harmony is likely to 
be a more important goal here than in individualistic settings, where there may be 
more tolerance for deviance (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006; Kim & Markus, 1999). At 
the same time, however, this desire to maintain harmony could also have positive 
effects on people’s decision to forgive, and motivate them to grant forgiveness for 
the sake of the relationship or the offender (e.g., Fu, Watkins, & Hui, 2004; Hook 
et al., 2013; Hook, Worthington, Utsey, Davis, & Burnette, 2012; Hui & Bond, 
2009). At present, it is unclear which motives are primary when people decide to 
(not) forgive ingroup deviants, and how this varies as a function of whether they 
live in cultural settings that are more collectivistic or individualistic.
To examine the role of such contextual factors on people’s motives to (not) for-
give, we not only focused on pela members in Indonesia (a collectivistic setting) 
but we also included pela members who live in a more individualistic setting (the 
Netherlands) and whose parents or grandparents immigrated to this country in 
the 1950s or 1960s (Smeets & Steijlen, 2006). These Moluccan immigrants were 
mostly soldiers of the former Dutch colonial army and they were transferred with 
their families to the Netherlands, due to frictions in the decolonization process of 
Indonesia. Although Dutch Moluccans in the Netherlands still tend to regard pela 
as an important symbol of Moluccan identity and of unity (Bartels, 1985; Smeets 
& Steijlen, 2006), they also live in a setting that is more individualistic (Hofstede, 
2001) and where pela norms may have become less important.
Pela and marital prohibition
Pela is an alliance that Moluccan ancestors from one or more villages formed with 
people from other villages and dates from the time (between the fifteenth and 
sixteenth century) when people headhunted and villages on the Moluccan isles 
3 Note that not all intervillage alliances have marital prohibition as a social norm.
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were often at war with each other. In those days pela between villages was formed 
for several reasons: for trade purposes, to prevent war, to stimulate friendships or 
to preserve family ties. Thus, in a sense, pela provided heads of villages a power-
ful tool to restore peace, to prevent conflict or to foster relationships with other 
villages (e.g., Bartels, 1977; Braüchler, 2009). To this day, confederates of most 
pela alliances address each other as “Pela” (e.g., uncle Pela Minggoes, grandma 
Pela Beth).
Like many other alliances, pela has customs and rules of conduct or cultural 
norms, called ‘adat pela’. A salient and important cultural norm of pela is marital 
prohibition, which stipulates that descendants from and inhabitants of one village 
are forbidden to marry descendants from or inhabitants of a pela allied village (e.g., 
Hilkhuijsen, Leatomu, & Wassing-Visser, 1984). Marital prohibition generally 
means that people are also prohibited to have a love affair with a Pela. Violating 
this marital prohibition can result in corporal punishment, disinheritance, ostra-
cism, avoidance or a pronunciation of a curse by family members (e.g., Huwaë, 
1996; Strijbosch, 1985). These sanctions can be imposed on members to preserve 
the adat pela. Up until now, inhabitants and descendants from allied villages in 
the Moluccas generally conform to this marital prohibition (Braüchler, 2009), 
whereas in the Netherlands this norm seems to be considered more as a guideline 
rather than an absolute prohibition (Voutz & Rinsampessy, 2008) 
Motives to not forgive deviant group members: concerns about the group
Pela still plays a key role in holding Moluccan communities together as it functions 
as a mechanism to foster relationships and to promote reconciliation (e.g., Bartels, 
1977; Braüchler, 2009). A case in point is one of the most violent conflicts that 
took place in the Moluccas in the period of 1999 to 2003. These conflicts were 
fought out mainly between Christians and Muslims. During these conflicts, also 
known as the ‘Kerusuhan’ (riots), pela became one of the primary means to build 
interreligious bridges and a common Moluccan identity, and to prevent any future 
disruption along religious lines (Braüchler, 2009). Given the central role of pela 
in the Moluccas, one might expect that people in the Moluccas are particularly 
concerned about the cultural group (e.g., protection of group identity, group 
harmony, or group values) when someone violates a central norm of pela. This 
may motivate them to not forgive those who violate the pela norm, since they 
threaten the unity of pela as a social group. In this regard, researchers have also 
found that group members who are highly identified with their group, evaluate a 
disloyal ingroup member who represents a threat to their identity more negatively 
than weakly identified members (Branscombe et al., 1993).
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For Moluccans in the Netherlands, pela still seems to be a symbol of their Mo-
luccan identity and unity (Bartels, 1990; Huwaë, 1996). The uniqueness of pela 
within the Moluccan culture appears to give people a feeling of distinctiveness 
and pride, which is important to face everyday challenges as a distinct group 
in a multi-ethnic society such as the Netherlands (Bartels, 1990). Nevertheless, 
there is also reason to believe that Moluccans who live in the Netherlands now 
attach less importance to the norms and values associated with pela than those in 
the homeland (e.g., Von Benda-Beckmann, 2015; Voutz & Rinsampessy, 2008). 
For example, a qualitative study on pela marital prohibition in the Netherlands 
indicates that important norms of pela such as unconditionally giving away 
personal belongings when a Pela asks for it, may have become less prominent 
(Huwaë, 2001). In addition, Voutz and Rinsampessy (2008) have suggested that 
in the Netherlands, marital prohibition no longer seems to be considered manda-
tory but rather voluntary as Dutch Moluccans increasingly tend to believe that 
people should decide for themselves what is best for them. This latter finding also 
suggests that for Moluccans in the Netherlands, independence has become more 
important, which may affect the extent to which they are concerned about group 
values and preserving group harmony as well. Thus, we expect that group motives 
play a less important role for Dutch Moluccans than for Indonesian Moluccans, 
because the customs and rules of pela are less important in their everyday lives and 
also because they may have become more individualistic.
Motives to forgive deviant group members: Concerns about the relationship, the offender, and the 
self
Even though concerns about the group’s identity may motivate people to not 
forgive those who have violated an important cultural norm (such as the pela 
marital prohibition in this study), there may also be various reasons why they may 
decide to forgive an ingroup deviant in such a situation. For example, researchers 
have pointed out that people may be motivated to forgive because they want 
to maintain a positive relationship with the transgressor (so-called relationship 
motives), because they feel compassion for him or her (so-called offender-focused 
motives) or because they want to protect the self (so-called self-focused motives) 
(e.g., Hook et al., 2009; Strelan et al., 2013).
Although little research has studied these motives across cultures, it has been ar-
gued that relationship and offender-focused motives should be particularly impor-
tant in collectivistic settings (such as the Moluccas in Indonesia), because people in 
such contexts tend to value harmony and should also be sensitive to the well-being 
of others (Hook et al., 2009; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sandage & Williamson, 
2005). Researchers have also made the case that in more individualistic settings 
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(such as the Netherlands), self-focused motives should be more important because 
people here tend to focus more on the maintenance of their own well-being. Thus, 
they should be more motivated to let go of unpleasant feelings and reduce stress 
following a transgression (e.g., Sandage & Williamson, 2005).
So far, however, studies that focused on motives to forgive have been conducted 
in individualistic cultures and the few studies that have been conducted in col-
lectivistic cultures (e.g., Takada & Ohbuchi, 2004) do not yield a clear picture, 
because they suggest that in such cultures self-focused motives may be important 
as well. For example, Takada and Ohbuchi (2004) found that Japanese participants 
were not only motivated to forgive an offender out of concern for this person or 
their relationship, but also out of concern for the self (e.g., to maintain a posi-
tive self-image), especially when the offender was someone they felt close to. In 
addition, we found in our previous study (Chapter 4) that Dutch and Moluccan 
participants did not differ in how important self-focused motives were. We also 
found that for Dutch participants self-focused motives were less important than 
relationship motives whereas these motives were equally important to Moluccan 
participants. For this reason, we examined the relative importance of relation-
ship motives, offender-focused motives and self-focused motives, compared with 
group motives for people in individualistic and collectivistic cultures when a 
group member violates a cultural norm.
The present study
To summarize, the aim of the present study is to investigate people’s motives to 
(not) forgive group members who have violated an important cultural norm, and 
to examine to what extent so-called ‘group motives’ play a role in this regard as 
well. More specifically, we examined whether for Indonesian Moluccans such mo-
tives play a more important role than for Dutch Moluccans, and whether this is 
mediated by how important the group (in this case: pela) is in their everyday lives. 
We also investigated how important group, relationship, offender-focused, and 
self-focused motives are within and across the two settings and whether differences 
in this regard can be explained by the extent to which people define themselves as 
more interdependent (which should be more prevalent in collectivistic cultures) 
or more independent (which should be more typical of people in individualistic 
cultures). Participants across the two samples were asked to evaluate a situation in 
which either a close or a non-close other violated the pela marital prohibition. We 
distinguished between close and non-close others because previous studies (e.g., 
Karremans et al 2011; Strelan et al., 2013) suggest that people’s relationship with 
transgressor may play a role in their motives to forgive, so we wanted to take this 





All participants were members of a pela alliance between the villages Allang and 
Latuhalat. These villages are located on the Isle of Ambon, which is situated in the 
Indonesian archipelago ‘the Moluccas’. A total of 193 pela members participated 
in the study. Of these participants, 100 participants live on the isle of Ambon 
(39 men, 61 women; Mage = 36.28, SD = 10.44) and 93 participants live in the 
Netherlands (40 men, 53 women; Mage = 46.87, SD = 11.64).4 Of the participants 
in the Moluccas, 13.5% had no diploma, 27.1% had a low educational level, 50% 
had a medium educational level and 9.4% had a high educational level. Of the 
participants in the Netherlands, 1.1% had no diploma, 19.8% had a low, 45.1% a 
medium, and 34.1% a high educational level. Below, we will refer to participants 
who live in the Moluccas as ‘Indonesian Moluccans’ and to those who live in the 
Netherlands as ‘Dutch Moluccans’.
The study had a 2 (cultural setting: Indonesian or Dutch) x 2 (type of relation-
ship with the ingroup deviant: close or non-close) design. In the close condi-
tion, the ingroup deviant was a brother (or a brother-in-law) or a sister (or a 
sister-in-law), whichever applied to participants’ own situation. Note that in the 
Moluccan culture, brother- and sister-in-law are considered important members 
of the family, to whom the family feels committed and with whom they share care 
and support (Hilkhuijsen et al., 1984). In the non-close condition, the ingroup 
deviant was someone from the same place of origin (i.e., Allang or Latuhalat) 
whom participants did not know that well or not at all.
Procedure
Participants on the isle of Ambon were recruited door-to-door in different villages 
by two local research assistants. Participants were asked to participate in a research 
on their pela alliance (i.e., between the village Allang and Latuhalat), but only after 
the research assistants had checked whether they considered themselves a member 
of this particular intervillage alliance. To diminish potential non-independence of 
the data, a maximum of two persons per household were allowed to participate 
4 Of the participants who lived on the isle of Ambon, a total of 41 participants originated from the vil-
lage Allang, 36 participants originated from the village Latuhalat, and 23 participants originated from 
another village but were member of this pela alliance via their husband or wife (N =100). Participants 
in the Netherlands had either both parents or one parent with a Moluccan origin. Those with one 
Moluccan parent had another parent of Dutch origin (N = 4) but considered themselves a member 
of this pela alliance. A total of 40 participants originated from the village Allang, 45 participants 
originated from the village Latuhalat, and 8 participants were member of this pela alliance via their 
(great)grandparents from either their mother’s or father’s genealogical line (N = 93).
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in this study. Participants received an envelope that included a questionnaire and 
were instructed to complete the questionnaire individually and to not discuss the 
study with other people, at least until after completion. The research assistants 
then made an appointment to collect the completed questionnaire within a week.
Participants in the Netherlands were recruited by the researcher and a research 
assistant via club meetings of members who share the same place of origin (i.e., 
the village Allang or Latuhalat), via social media and via social network sites. 
An envelope containing the questionnaire and a stamped envelope was handed 
over to those who considered themselves to be a pela member of the intervillage 
alliance in question and who wanted to participate in the study. Participants who 
were recruited through social media were asked to email their postal address so 
that the questionnaire could be send to them. Given that some participants were 
reluctant to give their postal address, we decided to administer the questionnaire 
online as well. In the end, 85 participants in the Netherlands completed a paper 
questionnaire and 8 participants completed the questionnaire online. Participants 
were asked to return the questionnaire within two weeks, and received a reminder 
via email.
As an introduction to the questionnaire, participants were informed that the 
purpose of the study was to examine how people appraise a situation where 
someone from their pela alliance has a love affair with another member (a Pela) 
from an allied village. Participants in the close ingroup deviant condition read the 
following scenario: “Your brother (-in-law), or sister (-in-law) is having a love affair 
with a Pela. The couple knows that both families are against this relationship, 
but the couple still continues this relationship”. In the non-close ingroup deviant 
condition, participants were asked to imagine that “Someone from your place of 
origin, whom you do not know that well or not at all” was having a love affair with 
a Pela.
Moluccan participants completed the questionnaire in Indonesian, whereas 
Dutch Moluccan participants completed it in Dutch. As the majority of scale 
items in the questionnaire were originally written in English, we followed the 
same standard practice for translation and back translation of instruments as in 
the previous chapter.
Measurements
After participants had read the scenario, they were asked to answer a number of 
statements that measured their motives to forgive or not to forgive the transgres-
sor. These motives were presented in a mixed order. All ratings were made using 
5-point scales with endpoints labeled 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree).
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To assess to what extent group motives played a role in the forgiveness process, 
participants were asked to rate their agreement with a set of items that were related 
to their identity and the norms and values of their group (e.g., “I would not 
forgive this person to protect my Moluccan identity”, “I would not forgive this 
person to protect my Moluccan norms and values”). For an overview of the items, 
see Appendix 5.1. To check the dimensionality of this scale, an exploratory factor 
analysis with direct oblimin rotation was conducted. This analysis resulted in one 
factor solution in which all 10 items loaded above .72. This factor accounted 
for 64.14% of the total variance, so the items were integrated into a group scale. 
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .88 for Indonesian Moluccans and .96 for 
Dutch Moluccans. A high score on this scale reflects that group motives play a 
relatively important role in the forgiveness process.
To assess to what extent participants endorsed relationship, offender-focused 
and self-focused motives, we used the Focus of Forgiveness scale of Strelan and 
colleagues (2013) that we also used for our previous study in Chapter 4. The 
relationship scale consisted of five items (e.g., “I would forgive this person, because 
maintaining a good relationship is important to me”). We used four items of 
the offender scale (e.g., “I would forgive this person, because I would truly feel 
sorry for this person”). The self-focus scale consisted of five items (e.g., “I would 
forgive this person so I do not feel hurt anymore”). The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
relationship scale was .82 for Indonesian Moluccans and .94 for Dutch Moluccans. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the offender-focus scale was .83 for Indonesian Moluccans 
and .87 for Dutch Moluccans, for the self-focus scale Cronbach’s alpha was .87 
for Indonesian Moluccans and .88 for Dutch Moluccans. A high score on these 
scales also indicates that these motives are relatively important in the forgiveness 
process.
To examine the importance of pela, we asked participants how important pela 
Allang-Latuhalat is in their life. They rated this question using a 5-point Likert 
scale with endpoints labeled 1 (not important at all) and 5 (very important).
To establish whether people define themselves in more independent or more 
interdependent terms we used an adapted version of the original Inclusion of 
Others in the Self scale (Swann, et al., 2009) developed by Aron and colleagues 
(1992). This scale, which was also used in the previous chapter, is a single-item 
pictorial scale that measures people’s sense of being interconnected with others. To 
determine the degree of forgiveness, we also asked participants to what extent they 
would forgive this person. They rated this question using a 5-point Likert scale 
with endpoints labeled 1 (not forgive at all) and 5 (completely forgive).
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Given that our study is (to our knowledge) among the first to examine forgive-
ness motives following norm violations, we used an alpha level of .10. First, we 
examined whether participants across the two samples differed in how important 
pela is. The analysis confirmed that pela played a more important role in the lives 
of Moluccans in Indonesia (M = 4.63, SD = 0.78) than in the lives of those in the 
Netherlands (M = 4.15, SD = 1.02), t(167.68) = 3.57, p < .001. We also found 
(using the Inclusion of Others in Self scale) that participants in Indonesia (M = 
4.07, SD = 1.23) had a stronger sense of interconnectedness or interdependence 
with others than those in the Netherlands (M = 3.51, SD = 1.14), t(188) = 3.25, 
p = .001.
Furthermore, we checked whether the samples differed in their willingness 
to forgive the ingroup deviant. A two-way ANOVA with cultural setting and 
relationship closeness (in terms of close other vs. non-close other) as independent 
variables suggests that pela members in the Netherlands were more inclined to 
forgive the ingroup deviant (M = 3.49, SD = 1.20) than those in Indonesia (M 
= 3.15, SD = 1.26), F(1, 187) = 3.85, p = .051, ηp2 = .02. There was no effect of 
relationship closeness, nor was there an interaction between cultural setting and 
relationship closeness, Fs < 1.38, ps > .24, ηp2s < .008.
We also assessed the correlations between the four forgiveness motives for 
Indonesian Moluccans and Dutch Moluccans separately. Within the Indonesian 
Moluccan sample, group motives were negatively related to motives that focused 
on the relationship, the offender, and the self, rs < -.29, ps < .004. However, 
relationship motives were positively related to offender-focused and self-focused 
motives, rs > .62, ps < .001. In the Dutch Moluccan sample, no correlations were 
found between group motives and the other three motives, rs > -.08, ps > .27, 
but we did find positive correlations between the relationship, offender-focused, 
and self-focused motives, rs > .72, ps < .001. An overview of these correlations is 
presented in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for forgiveness motives 
Indonesian Dutch
1 2 3 4M SD M SD
1. Group 2.96a 0.72 2.35a* 0.95 - .08 -.00 .12
2. Relationship 3.43b 0.73 3.01b* 1.02 -.30**  .81**  .77**
3. Offender 3.52b 0.78 3.23c* 1.01 -.39**  .76**  .72**
4. Self 3.43b 0.81 2.78d*** 0.89 -.39**  .62**  .65**
Note. A higher mean score indicates that a motive was more important in people’s decision to (not) for-
give. An asterix represents a significant difference between cultural settings. Means in the same column 
that do not share a subscript differ at p < .01 or p < .001. Correlations in the lower level of the matrix 
belong to Indonesian Moluccans and in the upper level to Dutch Moluccans.
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Motives to (not) forgive deviant group members across and within cultural settings 
To examine whether our samples differed in their motives to (not) forgive and to 
establish what the relative importance is of these motives within the Indonesian 
and Dutch setting, we conducted a 2 X 2 X 4 mixed ANCOVA with cultural set-
ting (Indonesian, Dutch) and relationship closeness (close, non-close) as between-
subjects factors, and the forgiveness motives (group, relationship, offender-focused 
and self-focused) as the within-subjects factor. Given that participants in the 
Netherlands were somewhat more inclined to forgive than those in Indonesia, we 
included this variable as a covariate. This covariate was significant in all analyses.
In terms of differences between cultural settings, we found a significant main 
effect of cultural setting, F(1, 181) = 33.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .16 (see Table 5.1 for 
an overview of the unadjusted means). As expected, contrast analyses revealed that 
Indonesian Moluccans were more likely to not forgive a deviant group member 
out of concern for the group than Dutch Moluccans. Yet, they were also more 
likely to forgive for the benefit of the relationship and the offender, Fs > 4.62, 
ps < .034, ηp2s > .02. Remarkably, they also endorsed self-focused motives more 
than Dutch Moluccan participants, F(1, 184) = 27.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. No 
significant main effect was found for relationship closeness, nor did we find an 
interaction between cultural setting and relationship closeness, Fs < 1.70, ps > .20, 
ηp2s < .01.
With regard to differences within the cultural settings, the interaction between 
cultural setting and the forgiveness motives revealed a trend, F(3, 369) = 3.00, 
p = .050, ηp2 = .02. Contrast analysis revealed that for Indonesian Moluccans, 
relationship, offender-focused, and self-focused motives were more important 
than group motives, Fs > 13.48, ps < .001, ηp2s > .06. We found no differences in 
the extent to which they endorsed relationship motives, offender-focused motives 
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or self-focused motives, Fs < 2.00, ps > .15. For Dutch Moluccans, group motives 
also played a less important role and they were more likely to forgive out of con-
cern for the relationship, the offender or the self, Fs > 11.20, ps < .01, ηp2s > .06. 
Remarkably, however, they also attached more importance to offender-focused 
motives than to relationship motives and self-focused motives, F(1, 184) = 12.61, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .06 and F(1, 184) = 44.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, respectively. In 
addition, they endorsed relationship motives more than self-focused motives, F(1, 
184) = 13.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .07.
The mixed ANOVA also revealed a trend for the interaction between cultural 
setting and relationship closeness, F(3, 369) = 2.78, p = .063 ηp2 = .02 (see Table 
5.2). Contrast analyses showed that Dutch Moluccans attached more importance 
to relationship motives when the ingroup deviant was a close other than a non-
close other, F(1, 185) = 10.76, p = .001, ηp2 = .03. The extent to which they en-
dorsed group motives and motives that focused on the offender or the self did not 
depend on who the ingroup deviant was, Fs < 1.82, ps > .18. For the Indonesian 
Moluccans, the relative importance of the four motives did not vary as a function 
of whether the ingroup deviant was a close or a non-close other, Fs < .14, ps > .70.
Table 5.2. Means and standard deviations for forgiveness motives as a function of cul-
tural setting and relationship closeness 
Indonesian Dutch
Close Non-close Close Non-close
Group 2.98 (0.70) 2.94 (0.76) 2.23 (0.90) 2.45 (0.99)
Relationship 3.43 (0.69) 3.44 (0.78) 3.31 (0.87)  2.74 (1.08)*
Offender 3.51 (0.72) 3.53 (0.84) 3.38 (0.86) 3.10 (1.12)
Self 3.49 (0.68) 3.37 (0.92) 2.92 (0.79) 2.64 (0.96)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. An asterix represents a significant difference between the 
close and non-close condition within a cultural setting.
*p < .05
Differences in group motives across cultural settings and importance of  the group 
In a follow-up analysis, we examined whether differences between Indonesian 
Moluccans and Dutch Moluccans in the endorsement of group motives could 
be explained by how important pela is for them. For this purpose, we conducted 
a mediation analysis using PROCESS (Model 4, Hayes, 2013), with the impor-
tance of pela as a mediator. We included the degree of forgiveness as well as the 
ingroup deviant condition (close vs. non-close) as covariates. We selected 5000 
bootstrapping samples and 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence inter-
vals to evaluate indirect effects. This analysis revealed an indirect effect of cultural 
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setting through importance of pela on group motives (B = .09, SE = .04), with 
a 95% bootstrap confidence interval that was estimated to lie between 0.03 and 
0.17. Thus, these results indicate that Indonesian Moluccans were more likely to 
not forgive out of concern for the group than Dutch Moluccans and that this was 
related to how important the pela alliance was for them.
As an additional check, we examined whether the importance of pela also 
mediated the relationship between cultural setting and the other three motives 
(relationship, offender-focused and self-focused). Separate analyses for each of 
these motives revealed that this was not the case. We did not find indirect effects 
of importance of pela on motives that concerned the relationship (B = -.01, SE = 
.04, 95% CI [-.08, .06]), offender (B = .04, SE = .04, 95% CI [-.02, .14]) or the 
self (B = .04, SE = .04, 95% CI [-.01, .13]).
Cultural setting, forgiveness motives and the role of  independent self  and interdependent self
Finally, we examined whether people’s self-definition (as either more independent 
or more interdependent) mediated the relationship between cultural setting and 
the various motives to (not) forgive, controlling for relationship closeness (close 
vs. non-close) and degree of forgiveness. For this, we again used PROCESS 
(Model 4), and we included the Inclusion of Others in Self scale as a mediator. 
The analysis did not reveal indirect effects of Inclusion of Others in the Self scale 
on group motives (B = .04, SE = .03, 95% CI [-.01, .12]), relationship motives 
(B = -.02, SE = .03, 95% CI [-.09, .04]), offender-focused motives (B = -.02, SE 
= .03, 95% CI [-.09, .04]), or self-focused motives (B = .01, SE = .03, 95% CI 
[-.05, .08]). Thus, the extent to which participants defined themselves as more 
independent or more interdependent did not mediate the relationship between 
cultural setting and the endorsement of the four forgiveness motives.
dISCuSSION
In the past years, researchers have started to examine why people forgive others 
following interpersonal transgressions. These studies generally assume that people 
forgive because it benefits the self, the offender, or the relationship. Nevertheless, 
transgressions can also occur within groups, for example when group members 
violate important cultural norms. In such a situation, concerns about the group 
(e.g., group identity) may actually motivate people to not forgive a deviant group 
member. In the present study, we examined how important these motives (group-, 
relationship-, offender- and self-focused) are across and within different cultural 
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settings, and whether this depends on how important the group is and on the 
cultural context (i.e., more collectivistic or more individualistic).
Our findings suggest that concerns about the group may motivate people to 
not forgive deviant group members, particularly when their social identity is 
at stake. We found that Indonesian Moluccans were more likely to not forgive 
people who violate a group norm (i.e., the pela marital prohibition) because pela 
as an intervillage alliance system was more important to them. This finding is 
in line with research on ingroup transgressions, which suggests that people who 
identify more with a group respond negatively to group members who violate core 
values of that group (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1993; Hornsey et al., 2006). In the 
Moluccan context, such threats to the pela identity are likely to be of particular 
concern to people because pela is an important mechanism to prevent conflict 
or to reconcile with people from other villages and hence plays a central part in 
holding Moluccan communities together (e.g., Braüchler, 2009). This may also 
help explain why we found a negative relationship between the group motives and 
(inter)personal motives in the Indonesian sample, but not in the Dutch sample. 
For participants in the Netherlands, pela norms appear to be less important, pos-
sibly due to acculturation processes and because customs and rules of pela may no 
longer fit in the Dutch context and gradually lose their significance (e.g., Huwaë, 
2001; Oostindie, 2010).
We also found, however, that people exhibited a stronger tendency to forgive an 
ingroup deviant out of concern for this person or out of concern for their relation-
ship with this person. This suggests that, even when important group norms have 
been violated, interpersonal concerns are more likely to prevail than concerns 
about the group. Although from a group-level perspective this may not seem 
adaptive, people’s motive to maintain relationships with deviant ingroup members 
could be beneficial in the long run because it may help preserve cooperative ties or 
cohesion within the group (e.g., Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002; 
McCullough, 2008; Yuki, 2003). It is possible, however, that the extent to which 
interpersonal concerns prevail also depends on the specific norm that has been 
violated. For example, concerns about the group may become more important 
when the norm violation has direct negative implications for the attainment of 
highly valued group goals (e.g., Biernat et al., 1999). In such a situation, the 
benefit of protecting the group may eventually outweigh the benefit of preserving 
one’s relationship with a deviant ingroup member. This may be particularly the 
case when the larger group is willing and able to not only punish (e.g., ostracize) 
the ingroup deviant but also those who are closely associated with him or her.
Of importance is that differences between the samples in the relative prevalence 
of the different motives to (not) forgive could not be explained by the extent to 
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which participants defined themselves as more independent (which is likely to be 
more prevalent in individualistic settings) or interdependent (which is considered 
more important in collectivistic settings). Similar results were also obtained in the 
previous chapter. Other findings also did not fit within an individualism-collec-
tivism framework. For example, although we did find that Indonesian Moluccans 
attached more importance to relationship and offender-focused motives than 
Dutch Moluccans, they also endorsed self-focused motives more than participants 
in the Netherlands. In addition, our within-group comparisons showed that 
Dutch Moluccans endorsed offender-focused and relationship motives more than 
self-focused motives. Although we do not have a clear explanation for why self-
focused motives were more important in the Moluccan than in the Dutch sample, 
it is possible that Dutch Moluccans felt less affected or less hurt by a violation of 
the marital inhibition. We can also not rule out the possibility that Indonesian 
Moluccan participants reported stronger endorsement of both intrapersonal and 
interpersonal norms because forgiveness is generally expected from them (e.g., 
Karremans et al., 2011). We should also note, however, that other studies on 
forgiveness motives (see Chapter 4 as well) also did not find clear support for 
the idea that concerns about the self prevail in more individualistic cultures and 
that concerns about the relationship are more important in collectivistic cultures 
(Takada & Ohbuchi, 2004; Strelan et al., 2013)
The fact that Dutch Moluccans (but not Indonesian Moluccans) endorsed rela-
tionship motives somewhat more with close than with non-close others seems to be 
more in accordance with an individualism-collectivism perspective. For example, 
Karremans and colleagues (2011) found that participants from the Netherlands 
and the US (more individualistic) were more likely to forgive close others than 
non-close others, but that this distinction was less important for participants 
from Japan and China (more collectivistic). According to these researchers, people 
from collectivistic cultures may have internalized the norm of maintaining social 
harmony so that it does not matter whether the ingroup deviant is a close other 
or not. They also suggest that people in individualistic cultures tend to rely on a 
relatively small number of close relationship partners to receive care and support 
and may therefore be motivated to forgive close others so as to maintain these 
valuable relationships. In collectivistic cultures, however, people tend to rely on 
more extended networks of support (e.g., co-villagers) and they may therefore 
be motivated to forgive both close others as well as non-close others (see also 
Kadiangandu, Gauché, Vinsonneau, & Mullet, 2007; Von Benda-Beckmann, 
2015). This may hold for our Indonesian Moluccan sample as well. For example, 
in the Moluccas people tend to rely on close relatives and on co-villagers to receive 
care, protection and support (Von Benda-Beckmann, 2015). This may explain 
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why Indonesian Moluccan participants did not distinguish between close others 
and non-close others in their decision to (not) forgive deviant group members.
To our knowledge, this study is among the first to examine people’s motives 
to (not) forgive ingroup members who have violated an important cultural 
norm, using samples that have traditionally been underrepresented in research. 
Having said that, we recognize that the sample sizes in the current study were 
relatively small and that we only focused on one specific kind of norm violation. 
Additional research that includes larger samples and focuses on different types of 
norm violations is necessary to gain more insight into people’s motives to (not) 
forgive deviant group members. The fact that we relied on scenarios may also 
have affected our results and we are aware that people may respond differently in 
a real-life situation. Thus, we recommend that future studies incorporate recall 
and qualitative methods to get more insight into people’s motives to (not) forgive 
deviant group members. These studies could also conceptualize forgiveness more 
broadly and not only assess the extent to which people are motivated to forgive 
an ingroup deviant but also whether they think that their group should forgive 
this person.
To conclude, the present research extends the literature on forgiveness by exam-
ining which motives are primary when people decide to (not) forgive a deviant 
group member and how this varies as a function of the cultural context. Our 
findings suggest that group motives may play a role in forgiveness processes when 
people’s identity is at stake, but they also suggest that interpersonal concerns are 
more important, regardless of the cultural context. Future studies should examine 
in more depth and across a wider range of settings the relative importance of 
motives to (not) forgive ingroup members who violate important group norms.
Appendix 5.1. Group motives scale 
I would….:
… not forgive to protect my Moluccan identity 
… not forgive, because he/she rejects his/her Moluccan identity
… not forgive, because he/she rejects the Moluccan identity of the family 
… not forgive, because he/she rejects his/her Moluccan norms and values 
… not forgive, because he/she rejects the Moluccan norms and values of the family 
… not forgive to protect my Moluccan norms and values
… not forgive, because preserving a relationship with other Pela’s is important to me
… not forgive for the sake of my relationship with other Pela’s 
… not forgive for the sake of myself and other Pela’s 
… not forgive, because I want to maintain a good relationship with other Pela’s

Chapter 6
General discussion and conclusion

87







One of the most widely used frameworks to understand cross-cultural differ-
ences in how people feel, think and respond to social interactions, is perhaps 
that of individualism-collectivism (or IC framework) (see for reviews Kagitcibasi, 
1997; Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002). A central assumption of this 
framework is that people who live in cultures that are more individualistic should 
view themselves as relatively independent from others and focus on the self, 
whereas those who live in more collectivistic cultures should view themselves 
as more interdependent and connected with others (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Triandis, 1995). Although a wealth of studies have used this framework 
to explain cross-cultural differences in people’s emotion, cognition and behavior, 
many researchers have also challenged some of its basic tenets and its usefulness 
as a universal model (e.g., Schwartz, 1990; Voronov & Singer, 2002). The aim 
of this dissertation was to add to current discussions on the explanatory value of 
the IC framework by examining how cross-cultural differences in individualistic 
and collectivistic values are manifested in a variety of interactive situations. We 
examined how people from individualistic and collectivistic cultures regulate their 
emotions during interactions with close others (such as family members) and 
non-close others (such as strangers). We also investigated how people from more 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures responded emotionally to situations in 
which they or their group were treated unfairly, and we examined what their 
motives were to (not) forgive close or non-close others following an interpersonal 
or ingroup transgression. In doing so, we examined whether differences between 
cultural settings could be explained by the extent to which people defined them-
selves as more independent (which reflects a stronger concern for the self ) or more 
interdependent (which reflects a stronger concern for others).
SuMMary Of fINdINGS 
One of the assumptions of the IC framework is that people from collectivistic 
cultures are more likely to value harmonious relationships than people from indi-
vidualistic cultures. Hence, they should suppress their emotions more than people 
from individualistic cultures so as to preserve harmonious relationships. Little is 
known, however, about cross-cultural differences in people’s emotion regulation 
in their everyday interactions, as most of the studies on cross-cultural differences 
in emotion regulation have been conducted in laboratory settings or have relied 
on surveys. Therefore, we examined in Chapter 2 whether people with collec-
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tivistic backgrounds differ from those with individualistic backgrounds in how 
they regulate positive and negative emotions during their everyday interactions 
and whether this depends on how close they are with their interaction partner. 
In particular, we investigated whether people from collectivistic backgrounds 
(Chinese students in the Netherlands and Moluccan students born and raised 
in the Netherlands) suppressed their emotions more as compared to those from 
individualistic backgrounds (Dutch students). Participants kept a diary for two 
weeks, in which they described to what extent they suppressed their emotions 
during face-to-face interactions with close others (e.g., friends, family, romantic 
partner) and non-close others (e.g., colleague, salesperson, acquaintance). In line 
with the IC-framework, we found that Chinese participants suppressed positive 
and negative emotions more than Dutch participants and that this was related 
to differences in the extent to which they defined themselves as more interde-
pendent or independent. We also found, however, that cross-cultural differences 
in emotion suppression depended on who the interaction partner was. Chinese 
participants suppressed positive emotions less in interactions with close others, 
whereas Dutch participants suppressed negative emotions more with close oth-
ers. No such differences were found for Moluccans. In addition, we found that 
Moluccan participants did not suppress their emotions differently from Dutch 
participants. This finding suggests that emotion suppression may change when 
people with collectivistic backgrounds have been raised in individualistic settings.
In Chapter 3, we focused on how people from individualistic and collectivistic 
backgrounds respond to injustice. Some researchers have argued that reactions 
to (un)fairness should be stronger among people with more independent selves 
(e.g., Van den Bos et al., 2011; Van Prooijen & Zwenk, 2009). Other researchers, 
however, believe that such responses should be stronger among those with more 
interdependent selves (e.g., Brockner et al., 2000; Brockner et al., 2005; Tyler et 
al., 1996). So far, the studies that have been conducted on this topic have been 
limited to within-culture comparisons using priming techniques, and have not 
compared responses to procedural injustice between individualistic and collectivis-
tic cultures (e.g., Van den Bos, Miedema, Vermunt, & Zwenk, 2011; van Prooijen 
& Zwenk, 2009). In addition, previous research on how people’s self-definition 
affects their reactions to injustice has also been limited to injustice that targets a 
specific individual whereas there are many instances of injustice that target people 
as a collective. We therefore examined the emotional reactions of individuals from 
individualistic (Dutch students) and collectivistic (Chinese students in the Neth-
erlands) backgrounds following injustice that targeted them individually or as a 
group. To this end, we conducted a laboratory experiment in which participants 
were either personally or collectively deprived of a monetary reward. Overall, our 
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findings provide more support for the idea that people with an interdependent self 
are more sensitive to injustice than those with an independent self. We found that 
Chinese participants reported more anger following the injustice manipulation 
than Dutch participants. We also found that they were more disappointed than 
Dutch participants, be it that Dutch participants with a more interdependent self 
were more disappointed than those with a less interdependent self. We did not 
find that the emotional responses of Dutch and Chinese participants were moder-
ated by the extent to which they defined themselves as independent. In addition, 
Dutch and Chinese participants did not differ in their emotional responses to 
either individual-based or group-based injustice. This finding does not support 
the idea that injustice that targets a group should be more threatening to people 
with collectivistic backgrounds than to those with individualistic backgrounds. 
Moreover, it is not in line with the individualism-collectivism framework that 
predicts that in collectivistic cultures the interest of the groups should prevail over 
the interest of the individual (Triandis, 1995).
In Chapter 4 and 5, we examined cross-cultural differences in people’s motives 
to forgive. In Chapter 4 we focused on people’s motives to forgive following an 
interpersonal transgression. We did so because researchers have argued that in 
individualistic cultures, people may be more inclined to forgive out of concern for 
the self (personal well-being) and that in collectivistic cultures, people may forgive 
more out of concern for others (well-being of the offender, interpersonal relation-
ships) (e.g., Sandage & Williamson, 2005). We also examined the relative impor-
tance of the different motives within the samples and whether the importance of 
these motives varies as a function of whether the offender is a close or non-close 
other. The sample in this study consisted of Dutch participants in the Netherlands 
and Moluccan participants in the Moluccas (Indonesia). Using a recall method, 
participants were asked to indicate how important forgiveness motives were to 
them following an interpersonal transgression and whether this depended on their 
relationship with the offender. In line with the idea that harmony and well-being 
of others are important in collectivistic cultures (e.g., Sandage & Williamson, 
2005), we found that Moluccan participants indeed endorsed relationship and 
offender-focused motives more than Dutch participants. At the same time, 
however, we found that Moluccan and Dutch participants did not differ in the 
extent to which they endorsed self-focused motives. Moreover, Dutch participants 
were more likely to endorse relationship motives (especially in close relations) 
than self-focused motives. For Moluccan participants, relationship, offender-, and 
self-focused motives were equally important and this did not depend on how 
close they were with the offender. Differences between the samples could not be 
explained by the extent to which people defined themselves as more independent 
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or interdependent. These findings go against the idea that people from collectiv-
istic cultures should be more concerned about their relationship with others and 
that those from individualistic cultures should be more concerned with their own 
well-being when they forgive an offender.
In Chapter 5, we focused on cross-cultural differences in motives to (not) forgive 
ingroup deviants following an ingroup transgression. More specifically, we were 
interested in whether people’s concerns about the group may also be important 
in such a situation (in addition to intrapersonal and interpersonal motives) and 
whether this varies as a function of whether they live in a cultural setting that is 
more individualistic or collectivistic. The sample in this study consisted of mem-
bers of an intervillage alliance, called ‘pela’, in Indonesia. They lived either in In-
donesia (a more collectivistic setting) or in the Netherlands (a more individualistic 
setting). An important norm of this particular pela alliance is that it is forbidden 
to marry confederates of allied villages. Participants were asked to read a scenario 
in which a group member (close other vs. non-close other) violated this marital 
prohibition. We found that concerns about the group can motivate people to not 
forgive an ingroup deviant, particularly when their social identity is at stake (which 
was more the case for Indonesian Moluccans). Across the two samples, however, 
participants were more inclined to forgive an ingroup deviant for the benefit of 
this person or their relationship. Interestingly, self-focused concerns were more 
important among Indonesian Moluccans and differences between the samples in 
the relative importance of the different motives could not be explained by people’s 
self-definition (i.e., more independent or interdependent). As in Chapter 4, these 
findings are not in line with the idea that relationship motives should be more 
important in collectivistic setting and that self-focused motives should be more 
important in individualistic settings (e.g., Sandage & Williamson, 2005).
ThEOrETICal IMplICaTIONS 
Our findings paint a nuanced picture of how cross-cultural differences in indi-
vidualistic and collectivistic values affect people’s reactions across a variety of 
interactions or situations with close and non-close others. On the one hand, the 
results with regard to emotion regulation suggest that people who were born and 
raised in collectivistic cultures do tend to suppress positive and negative emo-
tions in day-to-day interactions more than people from individualistic cultures, 
possibly because they are motivated to maintain harmonious relationships with 
others (e.g., Butler et al., 2007; Chiang, 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). They 
also tend to respond more negatively, however, to injustice than people from 
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individualistic cultures. On the other hand, our studies on people’s motives to 
(not) forgive indicate that self-focused motives can also be important for people 
who live in a collectivistic setting and that motives that focus on the relationship 
and/or the offender can also be significant for those who live in an individualistic 
setting, particularly with close others. This is more in line with a study by Vignoles 
and colleagues (2016) who found that people in more collectivistic cultures can 
also put their self-interest first and that people in individualistic cultures value 
commitment to others too.
Taken together, our results about how people regulate their emotions in their 
everyday interactions (Chapter 2) seem to fit best within the IC-framework. 
Although overall, participants did not seem to differ much in the emotions that 
they experienced in their everyday interactions, we did find that people with 
collectivistic backgrounds (Chinese) were more likely to suppress their emotions 
than those with individualistic backgrounds (Dutch). These findings suggest that 
the emotions that people display in their everyday interactions are guided more 
strongly by the social behavioral norms of the culture in which they have grown 
up than the emotions that they experience (e.g., Ho & Fung, 2011; Matsumoto & 
Hwang, 2012). Given the focus on harmony and conformity in more collectivistic 
cultures, the expression of positive (e.g., self-pride) or negative emotions (e.g., 
anger) is more likely to be discouraged (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). But in more 
individualistic cultures, people are generally encouraged to discover and express 
their unique attributes and they may therefore experience less pressure to suppress 
their positive or negative emotions (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto, 
Yoo, & Nakagawa, 2008).
Nevertheless, our findings with respect to the motives that people have to (not) 
forgive those who have offended them or who have violated an important social 
norm suggest that maintaining or restoring interpersonal harmony is not only 
important to people from collectivistic cultures but also to people from individu-
alistic cultures. Thus, even though harmony may be a more important cultural 
norm in collectivistic settings, at the individual level maintaining harmony seems 
to be important for people from individualistic cultures as well. This finding is 
in line with the idea that people have a universal need to establish or maintain 
positive relationships with others (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Hashimoto 
& Yamagishi, 2013). This need to maintain interpersonal bonds may motivate 
people from both individualistic and collectivistic cultures to alter their feelings 
and thoughts toward those who offended them or violated important norms in 
positive ways and to restore their relationship with them (e.g., Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). Yet, our findings also suggest that in collectivistic and individualistic 
settings, self-focused motives play a role in people’s decision to forgive, and this is 
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in line with the idea that maintaining one’s own well-being in stressful situations 
may be a basic human motive as well (e.g., Black, 2006).
Although it has been suggested that people from collectivistic cultures use 
the group to define and evaluate themselves and should also be more likely to 
compare between their own and other groups (e.g., Gómez, Kirkman, & Shapiro, 
2000), we did not find that they displayed stronger group-based responses when 
they were treated unfairly as a collective (Chapter 3). Moreover, concerns about 
the group played a less important role in their decision to forgive those who have 
violated an important group norm (Chapter 5) than concerns about their rela-
tionship with them. When it comes to people’s relationships with others, however, 
our studies also indicate that the distinction between close and non-close others is 
more important for people with individualistic backgrounds than for those with 
collectivistic backgrounds. For example, we found that Dutch participants in 
Chapter 2 were more likely to suppress both positive and negative emotions with 
non-close others, whereas Chinese participants only regulated positive emotions 
more with non-close than with close others but not their negative emotions. In 
addition, we found in Chapters 4 and 5 that Moluccan participants were less 
likely to distinguish between close and non-close others in their decision to (not) 
forgive than Dutch participants. Although we did not directly assess how this 
difference can be explained, it is possible that people from collectivistic cultures 
distinguish less between close and non-close others because they have a more 
holistic view and hence distinguish less between the self and others (e.g., Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991). Nevertheless, our findings may also reflect a basic difference 
in the importance of close versus non-close relationships in collectivistic and indi-
vidualistic cultures, and the degree of interdependence within a community. For 
example, although in more collectivistic cultures people may rely more strongly 
on a stable ingroup, this ingroup may be broader and include a larger variety of 
relationships on which people count for care, protection, and support than in 
individualistic cultures (Adams, Anderson, & Andonu, 2004; Kadiangandu et al., 
2007; Karremans et al, 2011; Von Benda-Beckmann, 2015). Thus, the distinction 
between close and non-close others may be less relevant here. Yet, in individual-
istic cultures people are more likely to form relationships with relative strangers 
and they tend to rely less on one stable ingroup or depend on a relatively small 
number of close relationship partners for care and support (e.g., Karremans et al., 
2011; Schug et al., 2010). As a result, they may distinguish more readily between 
close and non-close others.
A particular strength of the studies that we conducted is that we included 
individual trait measures (e.g., Singelis Self-construal Scale and Inclusion of 
Others in the Self scale) as well. Interestingly, we found across all four studies 
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that people with individualistic backgrounds scored higher on the independent 
self measures and that those with collectivistic backgrounds were higher on the 
interdependent selves measures. But, even though we did find that people’s self-
definition moderated some of their reactions (e.g., their emotion regulation and 
how they responded to injustice), we were not able to explain differences between 
the samples by including self-definition as a mediator in the analyses. This find-
ing is important because it suggests that some of the differences that we found 
between the samples are not driven by people’s self-concept (as is often assumed 
in the literature on individualism-collectivism), but may be due to other (cultural) 
differences. In this regard, future researchers should take into account the cultural 
values and norms and the degree of interdependence within a setting as well, in 
addition to measures that assess individual level variation in how people define 
themselves.
Our findings with regard to the Moluccan immigrants in our sample also under-
score that it is important to take contextual values into account. For example, we 
found that Dutch Moluccans were more likely to express emotions, scored similar 
to Dutch on a trait measure of emotion suppression and attached less importance 
to the norms and values associated with their cultural group, pela. Thus, these 
findings indicate that they have gradually adapted to the setting in which they 
now live, by adopting more individualistic values and less collectivistic ones. 
These findings are also in line with studies that have indicated that the longer 
non-western immigrants live in an individualistic society, the more they become 
similar to members of the host society in the intensity and frequency with which 
they experience emotions and the extent to which suppress their emotions (e.g., 
De Leersnyder et al. 2011; Eng, 2012; Stupar, Van de Vijver, & Fontaine, 2014).
lIMITaTIONS aNd fuTurE rESEarCh
With this dissertation we have contributed to the ongoing debate about the value 
of the individualism-collectivism framework, by examining how cross-cultural 
differences in individualistic and collectivistic values are manifested in a variety 
of situations. We also included samples (e.g., Moluccans in the Netherlands and 
in Indonesia) that have generally been underrepresented in research. At the same 
time, it is important to note that our samples were relatively small, which limits 
the possibility to generalize our findings. Moreover, even though we selected 
participants from cultures that are generally considered more individualistic or 
collectivistic, these cultures can differ in a number of other important ways as 
well (Smith, Fischer, Vignoles, & Bond, 2013). So, it is important to replicate 
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our findings with larger and more diverse samples and to take other (cultural) 
differences into account as well.
Another concern that we have is the validity of the Horizontal and Vertical 
Individualism-Collectivism scale (Triandis & Gelfland, 1998) that we used in 
our studies. As in other studies (e.g., Liao & Bond, 2011; Walker, 2009) the 
alpha’s for this scale were low, so we were not able to use it in our analyses. To 
overcome this problem, we used other scales as well such as the Self-Construal 
scale (Singelis, 1994) and the Inclusion of Others in the Self scale (Swann et al., 
2009). The latter scale has already been used in cross-cultural research on how 
people define themselves in relation to others (e.g., Li, Zhang, Bhatt, & Yum, 
2006; Uleman, Rhee, Bardoliwalla, Semin, & Toyama, 2000). Nevertheless, these 
individual-level measures of individualism-collectivism did not explain differences 
that we found between the samples in Chapter 4 and 5 and we do not know 
for certain whether this also has to do with the validity of these measures (for a 
discussion on the validity of self-construal scales, see Gudykunst & Lee, 2003 and 
Levine et al., 2003). Future studies will have to examine which measures can best 
be used to examine cross-cultural differences in individualism and collectivism at 
the individual and cultural level.
In addition to this, we are aware that the use of self-report measures in general is 
prone to influences of response styles. For example, it is possible that people from 
collectivistic cultures are more likely to give socially desirable responses and may 
respond in more agreeable ways, which could reflect cultural norms and values 
that prescribe appropriate ways of how to communicate with others (see He, Van 
de Vijver, Espinosa, & Mui, 2014 and He et al., 2015 for a discussion). For 
example, we found that all forgiveness motives (group, relationship, offender, self ) 
were more important for our Indonesian Moluccan sample. Although we were 
able to explain why group and self-focused motives were important in this sample 
as well, it is important to control for possible response biases. Future cross-cultural 
research may therefore want to use a combination of several methods (e.g., using 
forced-choice items and self-administered questionnaires rather than interviews) 
and a detection method (a social desirability scale) to minimize social desirability 
bias (Nederhof, 1985).
CONCludING rEMarkS
Our findings contribute to recent discussions on the explanatory value of the 
individualism-collectivism framework by showing that -- even though partici-
pants from individualistic and collectivistic cultures did indeed differ in how they 
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responded in a variety of circumstances -- these differences do not always fit with 
predictions made by this framework or could not always be explained by indi-
vidual differences in the extent to which participants defined themselves as more 
independent or interdependent. Our findings also indicate that -- depending upon 
the specific outcome measure -- the distinction between a more self-oriented or 
other-oriented focus is not always as clear-cut as is often suggested in the literature 
and may depend upon the situations in which people find themselves and on 
how close they are with those who are present. Future research should examine 
across a broader range of situations and cultural contexts how both individual 
and cultural level differences in individualism and collectivism impact people’s 






Adams, G., Anderson, S. L., & Adonu, 
J. K. (2004). The cultural ground-
ing of closeness and intimacy. In 
D. J. Mashek & A. Aron (Eds.), 
Handbook of closeness and intimacy 
(pp. 321-339). Mahwah, New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associ-
ates.
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. 
(1992). Inclusion of Other in the 
Self Scale and the structure of 
interpersonal closeness. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 
63, 596-612.
B
Ballester, S., Chatri, F., Sastre, M. T. M., 
Rivière, S., & Mullet, E. (2011). 
Forgiveness-related motives: A 
structural and cross-cultural ap-
proach. Social Science Information, 
50, 178-200.
Bartels, D. (1977). Guarding the 
invisible mountain: Intervillage 
alliances, religious syncretism and 
ethnic identity among Ambonese 
Christians and Muslims in the 
Moluccas. Doctoral Dissertation.
Bartels, D. (1985). Pela alliances in the 
Central Moluccas and in the Neth-
erlands: A brief guide for beginners. 
Retrieved October 13, 2015, from 
http://www.nunusaku.com/03_
publications/index.html#4 
Bartels, D. (1990). From Black Dutchmen 
to White Moluccans: Ethnic meta-
morphosis of an East-Indonesian 
minority in the Netherlands. Paper 
presented at the first conference 
on Maluku research. University 
of Hawaii at Manoa. Center for 
Southeast Asian Studies, Hono-
lulu, March, 16-18.
Baumeister, R. F., Exline, J. J., & Som-
mer, K.L. (1998). The victim 
role, grudge theory, and two 
dimensions of forgiveness. In E.L. 
Worthington, Jr. (Ed.), Dimen-
sions of forgiveness (pp. 79-104). 
Philadelphia: Templeton Founda-
tion Press.
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. 
(1995). The need to belong: De-
sire for interpersonal attachments 
as a fundamental human motiva-
tion. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 
497-529.
Bembenek, A. F., Beike, D. R., & 
Schroeder, D. A. (2007). Justice 
violations, emotional reactions, 
and justice-seeking responses. In 
D. De Cremer (Ed.), Advances 
in the psychology of justice and af-
fect (pp. 15-36). Charlotte, NC: 
Information Age Publishing.
Biernat, M., Vescio, T. K., & Billings, 
L. S. (1999). Black sheep and 
expectancy violation: integrating 
two models of social judgment. 




Black, P. (2006). Thrust to wholeness: 
The nature of self-protection. 
Review of General Psychology, 10, 
191-209.
Branscombe, N. R., & Wann, D. L. 
(1994). Collective self-esteem 
consequences of outgroup deroga-
tion when a valued social identity 
is on trial. European Journal of So-
cial Psychology, 24, 641-657.
Branscombe, N. R., Wann, D. L., Noel, 
J. G., & Coleman, J. (1993). In-
Group or out-group extremity: 
Importance of the threatened so-
cial identity. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 19, 381-388.
Braüchler, B. (2009). Cultural solutions 
to religious conflicts? The revival 
of tradition in the Moluccas, East-
ern Indonesia. Asian Journal of 
Social Science, 37, 872-891.
Brewer, M. B., & Chen, Y. R. (2007). 
Where (who) are collectives in 
collectivism? Toward conceptual 
clarification of individualism and 
collectivism. Psychological Review, 
114, 133-151.
Brockner, J., Chen, Y.-R., Mannix, E. 
A., Leung, K., & Skarlicki, D. P. 
(2000). Culture and procedural 
fairness: When the effects of what 
you do depend on how you do it. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 
45, 138-159.
Brockner, J., De Cremer, D., van den 
Bos, K., & Chen, Y.-R. (2005). 
The influence of interdependent 
self-construal on procedural fair-
ness effects. Organizational Behav-
ior and Human Decision Processes, 
96, 155-167.
Brown, R. P., Wohl, M. J. A., & Exline, 
J. J. (2008). Taking up offenses: 
Secondhand forgiveness and 
group identification. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 
1406-1419.
Butler, E. A., Lee, T. L., & Gross, J. J. 
(2007). Emotion regulation and 
culture: Are the social conse-
quences of emotion suppression 
culture-specific? Emotion, 7, 30-
48.
C
Chiang, W. (2012). The suppression of 
emotional expression in interper-
sonal context (大學生人際互動
情緒表達壓抑的探究). Bulletin 
of Educational Psychology, 43, 657-
680.
Coşkan, C., Phalet, K., Güngör, D., & 
Mesquita, B. (2016). Relationship 
context matters: Cultural differ-
ences in self-construals revisited. 
Cross-Cultural Research, 50, 63-84.
Cropanzano, R., Byrne, Z. S., Bobocel, 
D. R., & Rupp, D. E. (2001). 
Moral virtues, fairness heuristics, 
social entities, and other denizens 
of organizational justice. Journal of 




Deaux, K., Reid, A., Mizrahi, K., & 
Cotting, D. (1999). Connecting 
the person to the social: The func-
tions of social identification. In T. 
R. Tyler, R. M. Kramer & O. P. 
John (Eds.), The Psychology of the 
Social Self (pp. 91-113). Mahwah, 
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). 
The” what” and” why” of goal 
pursuits: Human needs and the 
self-determination of behavior. 
Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268.
De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2005a). 
Managing group behavior: The 
interplay between procedural 
justice, sense of self, and coop-
eration. Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, 37, 151-218.
De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2005b). 
Am I respected or not? Inclusion 
and reputation as issues in group 
membership. Social Justice Re-
search, 18, 121-153.
De Leersnyder, J., Mesquita, B., & Kim, 
H. S. (2011). Where do my emo-
tions belong? A study of immi-
grants’ emotional acculturation. 
Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 37, 451-463.
E
Elliot, A. J. (2008). Approach and 
avoidance motivation. In A. J. 
Elliot (Ed.), Handbook of ap-
proach and avoidance motivation 
(pp. 3-14). New York: Taylor & 
Francis Group.
Eng, J. S. (2012). Emotion regulation 
and culture: The effects of cultural 
models of self on Western and East 
Asian differences in suppression and 
reappraisal. Doctoral dissertation. 
Retrieved December, 8, 2014, 
from http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/3fg3k1p0 
English, T., & Chen, S. (2007). Cul-
ture and self-concept stability: 
Consistency across and within 
contexts among Asian Americans 
and European Americans. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 
93, 478-490.
English, T., & John, O. P. (2013). 
Understanding the social effects of 
emotion regulation: The mediat-
ing role of authenticity for indi-
vidual differences in suppression. 
Emotion, 13, 314-329.
Exline, J. J., Worthington, E. L., Hill, 
P., & McCullough, M. E. (2003). 
Forgiveness and justice: A research 
agenda for social and personality 
psychology. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 7, 337-348.
f
Finkel, E. J., Rusbult, C. E., Kumashiro, 
M., & Hannon, P. A. (2002). 
Dealing with betrayal in close 
relationships: Does commitment 
promote forgiveness? Journal of 




Fischer, R., & Schwartz, S. (2011). 
Whence differences in value 
priorities? Individual, cultural, 
or artifactual sources. Journal 
of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 42, 
1127-1144.
Foster, M. D., & Matheson, K. (1999). 
Perceiving and responding to the 
personal/group discrimination 
discrepancy. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1319-
1329.
Fu, H., Watkins, D., & Hui, E. K. P. 
(2004). Personality correlates of 
the disposition towards inter-
personal forgiveness: A Chinese 
perspective. International Journal 
of Psychology, 39, 305-316.
G
Gómez, C., Kirkman, B. L., & Shapiro, 
D. L. (2000). The impact of col-
lectivism and in-group/out-group 
membership on the evaluation 
generosity of team members. The 
Academy of Management Journal, 
43, 1097-1106.
Gross, J. J., Richards, J. M., & John, O. 
P. (2006). Emotion regulation in 
everyday life. In D. K. Snyder, J. 
Simpson & J. N. Hughes (Eds.), 
Emotion regulation in couples and 
families: Pathways to dysfunction 
and health (pp. 13-35). Washing-
ton, DC: American Psychological 
Association.
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Indi-
vidual differences in two emotion 
regulation processes: Implications 
for affect, relationships, and well-
being. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 85, 348-362.
Gudykunst, W. B., & Lee, C. M. 
(2003). Assessing the validity of 
Self Sonstrual Scales. A response 
to Levine et al. Human Communi-
cation Research, 29, 253-274.
h
Haga, S. M., Kraft, P., & Corby, E.-K. 
(2009). Emotion regulation: 
Antecedents and well-being 
outcomes of cognitive reappraisal 
and expressive suppression in 
cross-cultural samples. Journal of 
Happiness Studies, 10, 271-291.
Hashimoto, H., & Yamagishi, T. (2013). 
Two faces of interdependence: 
Harmony seeking and rejection 
avoidance. Asian Journal of Social 
Psychology, 16, 142-151.
Hayes, A. F. (2013).   Introduction to 
mediation, moderation, and condi-
tional process analysis. New York: 
The Guilford Press. 
He, J., van de Vijver, F. J. R., Espinosa, 
A. D., Abubakar, A., Dimitrova, 
R., Adams, B. G., . . . Villieux, 
A. (2015). Socially desirable 
responding: Enhancement and 
denial in 20 countries. Cross-
Cultural Research, 49, 227-249.
101
references
He, J., Van de Vijver, F. J., Espinosa, A. 
D., & Mui, P. H. (2014). Toward 
a unification of acquiescent, 
extreme, and midpoint response 
styles: A multilevel study. Inter-
national Journal of Cross Cultural 
Management, 14, 306-322.
Hilkhuijsen, J., Leatomu, D., & Was-
sing-Visser, R. (1984). Pameran 
Masohi Maluku: De Molukken, 
tussen traditie en toekomst [Exhibi-
tion, Teamwork Moluccas. The 
Moluccas between tradition and 
future]. Delft: Volkenkundig 
Museum Nusantara.
Ho, M. Y., & Fung, H. H. (2011). A 
dynamic process model of forgive-
ness: A cross-cultural perspective. 
Review of General Psychology, 15, 
77-84.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s conse-
quences: Comparing values, behav-
iors, institutions, and organizations 
across nations (2nd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications.
Hofstede, G.J., Minkov, M., Hofstede, 
G. (2014). Allemaal andersdenken-
den: Omgaan met cultuurverschil-
len [Different minded people: 
Managing cultural differences]. 
Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Contact.
Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. L., Davis, 
D. E., Watkins, D., Hui, E., Luo, 
W., . . . Reyna, S. H. (2013). A 
China–New Zealand comparison 
of forgiveness. Asian Journal of 
Social Psychology, 16, 286-291.
Hook, J.N., Worthington, E.L., & 
Utsey, S.O. (2009). Collectivism, 
forgiveness, and social harmony. 
The Counseling Psychologist, 37, 
821-847.
Hook, J. N., Worthington, E. L., Utsey, 
S. O., Davis, D. E., & Burnette, J. 
L. (2012). Collectivistic self-con-
strual and forgiveness. Counseling 
& Values, 57, 109-124.
Hornsey, M. J., Jetten, J., McAuliffe, B. 
J., & Hogg, M. A. (2006). The 
impact of individualist and collec-
tivist group norms on evaluations 
of dissenting group members. 
Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 42, 57-68.
Hui, V. K.-Y., & Bond, M. H. (2009). 
Target’s face loss, motivations, and 
forgiveness following relational 
transgression: Comparing Chi-
nese and US cultures. Journal of 
Social and Personal Relationships, 
26, 123-140.
Huwaë, S. (2001). Het Pelaschap leeft 
voort: De rol en de betekenis van 
het Pelaschap in Molukse gezinnen 
[Pela continues. The role and 
meaning of Pela in Moluccan 
families]. Nijmegen: Muhabbat.
Huwaë, S. (1996). Het Pela-trouwver-
bod: Een collectieve of individuele 
aangelegenheid? Het Pelaschap in 
discussie onder Molukse jongeren in 
Nederland [Pela marital prohibi-
tion: A collective or an individual 
matter? Debate on Pela among 
Moluccan youth in the Nether-
lands]. Nijmegen: Muhabbat.
I
Imamoğlu, E. O. (1998). Individualism 
and collectivism in a model and 
Scale of Balanced Differentiation 




Iyer, A., Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. 
(2007). Why individuals protest 
the perceived transgressions of 
their country: The role of anger, 
shame, and guilt. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 572-
587.
J
Johns, M., Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. 
(2005). Ashamed to be an Ameri-
can? The role of identification in 
predicting vicarious shame for 
anti-Arab prejudice after 9-11. 
Self & Identity, 4, 331-348.
k
Kadiangandu, J. K., Gauché, M., Vin-
sonneau, G., & Mullet, E. (2007). 
Conceptualizations of forgiveness: 
Collectivist-Congolese versus 
individualist-French viewpoints. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychol-
ogy, 38, 432-437.
Kagitcibasi, C. (2005). Autonomy and 
relatedness in cultural context: 
Implications for self and family. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychol-
ogy, 36, 403-422.
Kagitçibasi, Ç. (1997). Individualism 
and collectivism. In J. W. Berry, 
M. H. Segall, & C. Kagitcibasi 
(Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural 
psychology (Vol. 3, pp. 1-50). 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Karremans, J. C., Regalia, C., Paleari, 
F. G., Fincham, F. D., Cui, M., 
Takada, N., . . . Uskul, A. K. 
(2011). Maintaining harmony 
across the globe: The cross-cultural 
association between closeness and 
interpersonal forgiveness. Social 
Psychological and Personality Sci-
ence, 2, 443-451.
Karremans, J. C., Van Lange, P. A. M., 
Ouwerkerk, J. W., & Kluwer, E. S. 
(2003). When forgiving enhances 
psychological well-being: The role 
of interpersonal commitment. 
Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 84, 1011-1026.
Killen, M., & Wainryb, C. (2000). In-
dependence and interdependence 
in diverse cultural contexts. New 
Directions for Child and Adolescent 
Development, 2000, 5-21.
Kim, H., & Markus, H. R. (1999). 
Deviance or uniqueness, harmony 
or conformity? A cultural analysis. 
Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 77, 785-800.
Kitayama, S., Mesquita, B., & Kara-
sawa, M. (2006). Cultural affor-
dances and emotional experience: 
Socially engaging and disengaging 
emotions in Japan and the United 
States. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 91, 890-903.
Koper, G., Van Knippenberg, D., 
Bouhuijs, F., Vermunt, R., & 
Wilke, H. (1993). Procedural 
fairness and self-esteem. European 




Krehbiel, P. J., & Cropanzano, R. (2000). 
Procedural justice, outcome favor-
ability and emotion. Social Justice 
Research, 13, 339-360.
l
Levine, T. R., Bresnahan, M. J., Park, H. 
S., Lapinski, M. K., Wittenbaum, 
G. M., . . . Ohashi, R. (2003). 
Self-construal scales lack validity. 
Human Communication Research, 
29, 210-252.
Li, H. Z. (2002). Culture, gender and 
self–close-other(s) connectedness 
in Canadian and Chinese samples. 
European Journal of Social Psychol-
ogy, 32, 93-104.
Li, H. Z., Zhang, Z., Bhatt, G., & 
Yum, Y.-O. (2006). Rethinking 
culture and self-construal: China 
as a Middle Land. Journal of Social 
Psychology, 146, 591-610.
Liao, Y., & Bond, M. (2011). The 
dynamics of face loss following 
interpersonal harm for Chinese 
and Americans. Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 42, 25-38.
Licea, I. L. (2013). Today’s glass ceiling: 
Executive women’s experiences 
and perceptions regarding career 
advancement into executive leader-
ship positions in transportation. 
Doctoral Dissertation. Retrieved 







Mark, M. M. (1985). Expectations, 
procedural justice, and alterna-
tive reactions to being deprived 
of a desired outcome. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 
114-137.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). 
Culture and the Self: Implications 
for cognition, emotion and mo-
tivation. Psychological Review, 98, 
224-253.
Marques, J. M., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Ley-
ens, J.-P. (1988). The ‘Black Sheep 
Effect’: Extremity of judgments 
towards ingroup members as a 
function of group identification. 
European Journal of Social Psychol-
ogy, 18, 1-16.
Matsumoto, D. (1999). Culture and 
self: An empirical assessment of 
Markus and Kitayama’s theory of 
independent and interdependent 
self-construals. Asian Journal of 
Social Psychology, 2, 289-310.
Matsumoto, D. (1990). Cultural simi-
larities and differences in display 
rules. Motivation and Emotion, 14, 
195-214.
Matsumoto, D., & Hwang, H. S. 
(2012). Culture and emotion: 
The integration of biological and 
cultural contributions. Journal 




Matsumoto, D., Takeuchi, S., Andayani, 
S., Kouznetsova, N., & Krupp, 
D. (1998). The contribution of 
individualism vs. collectivism to 
cross-national differences in dis-
play rules. Asian Journal of Social 
Psychology, 1, 147-165.
Matsumoto, D., Yoo, S. H., & Nak-
agawa, S. (2008). Culture, emo-
tion regulation, and adjustment. 
Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 94, 925-937.
McCullough, M. E. (2008). Beyond re-
venge. The evolution of the forgive-
ness instinct. San Francisco: Jossey 
Bass.
McCullough, M. E., Fincham, F. D., & 
Tsang, J.-A. (2003). Forgiveness, 
forbearance, and time: The tem-
poral unfolding of transgression-
related interpersonal motivations. 
Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 84, 540-557.
McCullough, M. E., Pargament, K. 
I., & Thoresen, C. E. (2000). 
The psychology of forgiveness: 
History, conceptual issues, and 
overview. In M. E. McCullough, 
K. I. Pargament & C. E. Thoresen 
(Eds.), Forgiveness: Theory, research, 
and practice (pp. 1-14). New York: 
The Guilford Press.
Mesquita, B., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2001). 
The role of culture in appraisal. 
In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr & 
T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal 
processes in emotion (pp. 233-248). 
New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Mikula, G. (1986). The experience of 
injustice. In H. W. Bierhoff, R. 
L. Cohen & J. Greenberg (Eds.), 
Justice in social relations (pp. 103-
123). New York: Plenum Press.
N
Nederhof, A. J. (1985). Methods of cop-
ing with social desirability bias: A 
review. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 15, 263-280.
Neff, K. D., Brabeck, K. M., & Kearney, 
L. K. (2006). Relationship styles 
of self-focused autonomy, other-
focused connection, and mutual-
ity among Mexican American 
and European American college 
students. The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 146, 568-590.
Nezlek, J. B. (2011). Multilevel modeling 
for social and personality psychology. 
Los Angeles: Sage Publications.
Nezlek, J. B., & Kuppens, P. (2008). 
Regulating positive and negative 
emotions in daily life. Journal of 
Personality, 76, 561-580.
O
Oostindie, G. J. (2010). Postcolonial 
Netherlands: Sixty-five years of 
forgetting, commemorating, silenc-
ing. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press.
Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kem-
melmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking 
individualism and collectivism: 
Evaluation of theoretical assump-
tions and meta-analyses. Psycho-




Piff, P. K., Martinez, A. G., & Keltner, 
D. (2011). Me against we: In-
group transgression, collective 
shame, and in-group-directed 
hostility. Cognition & Emotion, 
26, 634-649.
r
Raudenbush, S., Bryk, T, & Congdon, 
R. (2000). HLM 6 Hierarchical 
Linear and Nonlinear Modeling. 
Scientific Software International, 
Inc.
Rinsampessy, E. (1992). Saudara 
bersaudara: Molukse identiteit in 
processen van cultuurverandering 
[Brotherhood: Moluccan identity 
in processes of cultural change]. 
Assen: Van Gorcum.
Roseman, I. J. (2008). Motivations and 
emotivations: Approach, avoid-
ance, and other tendencies in mo-
tivational and emotional behavior. 
In A. J. Elliot (Ed.), Handbook of 
approach and avoidance motiva-
tion (pp. 343-366). New York: 
Psychology Press.
S
Sandage, S. J., & Wiens, T. W. (2001). 
Contextualizing models of humil-
ity and forgiveness: A reply to 
Gassin. Journal of Psychology & 
Theology, 29, 201-211.
Sandage, S. J., & Williamson, I. (2005). 
Forgiveness in cultural context. 
In E. L. Worthington Jr (Ed.), 
Handbook of forgiveness (pp. 41-
55). New York: Routledge.
Schaafsma, J. (2008). Interethnic rela-
tions at work: Examining ethnic 
minority and majority members’ 
experiences in The Netherlands. 
International Journal of Intercul-
tural Relations, 32, 453-465.
Schaafsma, J. (2011). Discrimination 
and subjective well-being: The 
moderating roles of identification 
with the heritage group and the 
host majority group. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 
786-795.
Schaafsma, J., Nezlek, J. B., Krejtz, I., 
& Safron, M. (2010). Ethnocul-
tural identification and naturally 
occurring interethnic social in-
teractions: Muslim minorities in 
Europe. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 40, 1010-1028.
Schug, J., Yuki, M., & Maddux, W. 
(2010). Relational mobility 
explains between- and within-cul-
ture differences in self-disclosure 
to close friends. Psychological Sci-
ence, 21, 1471-1478.
Schwartz, S. H. (1990). Individualism-
collectivism: Critique and 
proposed refinements. Journal 




Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals 
in the content and structure of 
values: Theoretical advances and 
empirical tests in 20 countries. 
In P. Z. Mark (Ed.), Advances 
in experimental social psychology 
(Vol. 25, pp. 1-65). San Diego: 
Academic Press.
Schwartz, N., & Sudman, S. (Eds) 
(1992). Context effects in social and 
psychological research. New York: 
Springer-Verlag.
Sedikides, C., & Gaertner, L. (2001). 
A homecoming to the individual 
self. Emotional and motivational 
primacy. In C. Sedikides & M. B. 
Brewer (Eds.), Individual self, rela-
tional self, collective self (pp. 7-23). 
Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Singelis, T. M. (1994). The measurement 
of independent and interdepen-
dent self-construals. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 
580-591.
Smeets, H., & Steijlen, F. (2006). In 
Nederland gebleven: De geschie-
denis van Molukkers 1951-2006 
[Staying in the Netherlands. The 
history of Moluccans 1951-2006]. 
Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bak-
ker/Moluks Historisch Museum.
Smith, P. B., Fischer, R., Vignoles, V. 
L., & Bond, M. H. (2013). Un-
derstanding social psychology across 
cultures: Engaging with others in a 
changing world. Los Angeles: Sage.
Strelan, P., & Covic, T. (2006). A review 
of forgiveness process models 
and a coping framework to guide 
future research. Journal of Social 
and Clinical Psychology, 25, 1059-
1085.
Strelan, P., McKee, I. A. N., Calic, D., 
Cook, L., & Shaw, L. (2013). For 
whom do we forgive? A functional 
analysis of forgiveness. Personal 
Relationships, 20, 124-139.
Strijbosch, F. (1985). Concept of PELA 
and its social significance in the 
community of Moluccan immi-
grants in the Netherlands. Journal 
of Legal Pluralism & Unofficial 
Law, 23, 177-208.
Stupar, S., van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Fon-
taine, J. R. J. (2014). Emotional 
suppression and well-being in 
immigrants and majority group 
members in the Netherlands. 
International Journal of Psychology, 
49, 503-507.
Suh, E. M. (2000). Self, the hyphen 
between culture and subjective 
well-being. In E. Diener & E. M. 
Suh (Eds.), Culture and Subjective 
Well-being (pp. 63-86). Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: MIT press.
Suwartono, C., Prawasti, C.Y., & Mul-
let, E. (2007). Effect of culture 
on forgiveness: A Southern Asia-
Western Europe comparison. Per-
sonality and Individual Differences, 
42, 513-523.
Swann, W. B., Jr., Gómez, Á., Seyle, 
D. C., Morales, J. F., & Huici, 
C. (2009). Identity fusion: The 
interplay of personal and social 
identities in extreme group be-
havior. Journal of Personality and 




Takada, N., & Ohbuchi, K.-I. (2004). 
Why do we forgive offenders? 
Egocentric, altruistic, and norma-
tive motives for interpersonal 
forgiveness. Tohoku Psychologica 
Folia, 63, 95-102.
Tamis-LeMonda, C. S., Way, N., 
Hughes, D., Yoshikawa, H., Kal-
man, R. K., & Niwa, E. Y. (2008). 
Parents’ goals for children: The 
dynamic coexistence of individu-
alism and collectivism in cultures 
and individuals. Social Develop-
ment, 17, 183-209.
Tepper, B. J. (2001). Health conse-
quences of organizational injus-
tice: Tests of main and interactive 
effects. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 86, 
197-215.
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism 
and Collectivism. New Directions 
in Social Psychology. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, Inc.
Triandis, H. C., Bontempo, R., Vil-
lareal, M. J., Asai, M., & Lucca, 
N. (1988). Individualism and col-
lectivism: Cross-cultural perspec-
tives on self-ingroup relationships. 
Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54, 323-338.
Triandis, H. C., & Gelfand, M. J. 
(1998). Converging measure-
ment of horizontal and vertical 
individualism and collectivism. 
Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74, 118-128.
Tunjanan, T. P. (2008). Molukse jongeren 
& onderwijs: Quick scan 2008 
[Moluccan Youth and education: 
Quick scan 2008]. Utrecht: FO-
RUM.
Tyler, T., Degoey, P., & Smith, H. (1996). 
Understanding why the justice of 
group procedures matters: A test 
of the psychological dynamics of 
the group-value model. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 
70, 913-930.
Tyler, T. R., & Smith, H. J. (1999). 
Justice, social identity, and group 
processes. In T. R. Tyler, R. M. 
Kramer & O. P. John (Eds.), The 
Psychology of the Social Self (pp. 
223-264). Mahwah, New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc.
u
Uchida, Y., & Kitayama, S. (2009). 
Happiness and unhappiness in 
east and west: Themes and varia-
tions. Emotion, 9, 441-456.
Uleman, J. S., Rhee, E., Bardoliwalla, 
N., Semin, G., & Toyama, M. 
(2000). The relational self: Close-
ness to ingroups depends on who 
they are, culture, and the type of 





Van den Bos, K., Miedema, J., Vermunt, 
R., & Zwenk, F. (2011). A self-
activation hypothesis of affective 
reactions to fair and unfair events: 
Evidence for supraliminal and 
subliminal processes. Social Justice 
Research, 24, 6-24.
Van den Bos, K., Veldhuizen, T. S., & 
Au, A. K. C. (2015). Counter 
cross-cultural priming and 
relative deprivation: The role of 
individualism-collectivism. Social 
Justice Research, 28, 52-75.
Van Prooijen, J.-W., & Zwenk, F. 
(2009). Self-construal level and 
voice procedures: The individual 
self as psychological basis for 
procedural fairness effects. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 
45, 392-397.
Vignoles, V. L., Owe, E., Becker, M., 
Smith, P. B., Easterbrook, M. 
J., Brown, R., . . . Bond, M. H. 
(2016). Beyond the ‘east–west’ 
dichotomy: Global variation 
in cultural models of selfhood. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 145, 966-1000.
Von Benda-Beckmann, K. (2015). 
Social security, personhood, and 
the state. Asian Journal of Law and 
Society, 2, 323-338.
Voronov, M., & Singer, J. A. (2002). 
The myth of individualism-collec-
tivism: A critical review. Journal of 
Social Psychology, 142, 461-480.
Voutz, H., & Rinsampessy, E. (2008). 
Tussen adat en integratie: Een 
analyse van de situatie van 
Molukkers in Nederland. In: E. 
Rinsampessy (Ed.), Tussen adat 
en integratie: Vijf generaties Mo-
lukkers worstelen en dansen op de 
Nederlandse aarde [Between adat 
and integration: Five generations 
of Moluccans struggle and dance 
on Dutch soil]. Haps: Drukkerij 
Weemen.
w
Wheeler, L., & Nezlek, J. (1977). Sex 
differences in social participation. 
Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 35, 742.
Walker, G. J. (2009). Culture, self-
construal, and leisure motivations. 
Leisure Sciences, 31, 347-363.
Wheeler, L., & Nezlek, J. (1977). Sex 
differences in social participation. 
Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 35, 742-754.
Witvliet, C. V., Ludwig, T. E., & Van 
der Laan, K. L. (2001). Granting 
forgiveness or harboring grudges: 
Implications for emotion, physi-





Yuki, M. (2003). Intergroup comparison 
versus intragroup relationships: 
A cross-cultural examination of 
social identity theory in North 
American and East Asian cultural 
contexts. Social Psychology Quar-
terly, 66, 166-183.
Yuki, M., Maddux, W. W., Brewer, 
M. B., & Takemura, K. (2005). 
Cross-cultural differences in rela-
tionship- and group-based trust. 
Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 31, 48-62.
Yuki, M., & Takemura, K. (2014). 
Intergroup comparison and intra-
group relationship. In M. Yuki & 
M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Culture and 
Group Processes (pp. 38-65). New 





Finally, a long-cherished wish to obtain a doctorate degree has come true! Ever 
since I was a psychology student, it was already clear to me that I wanted to 
continue an academic career after my graduation and get a PhD. Preferably in the 
area of cultural psychology. So, after I got my master’s degree I immediately tried 
to obtain a position as a PhD student, in vain. Fortunately, I got the opportunity 
to work as a researcher at Radboud University and various research institutes and 
organizations, which I enjoyed a lot. But my desire to get a doctorate degree 
remained and I realized that if I wanted to achieve this I had to create one myself 
with the help of others. 
My PhD research project at Tilburg University would not have been possible 
without the collaboration between the Province of Noord-Brabant, Stichting 
Palet (my former employer), Tilburg University and OVAA-Eindhoven. I am 
very grateful to the Province of Noord-Brabant and Tilburg University who have 
supported my promotion research together, financially. Special thanks go to Anjo 
Roorda and Han Rijgersberg from Stichting Palet who have fully supported me 
and dedicated themselves to establish a collaboration with Tilburg University. I 
am also grateful to Fons Maes from Tilburg University for providing me with an 
inspiring work environment with open-hearted researchers at Tilburg Center for 
Cognition and Communication. 
This dissertation would not have been possible without my two dear promotores, 
Juliette and Emiel who have taken me under their wings. They have learned me 
the ins and outs and the tricks of how to write a thesis. I really enjoyed their pleas-
ant personalities, cheerfulness, shrewdness, and not forgetting their jokes during 
the meetings. Juliette, the endless patience, kindness, optimism and comforting 
words that I received during my weekly meetings with you have made these five 
years more enjoyable and bearable. I can imagine how frustrating it often must 
have been for you when discussing my work and repeating yourself over and over 
again. Thank you for not showing this when you felt this way. You have learned me 
the tricks for how to write a paper and have shown me how to interpret complex 
analyses. I am so lucky to have you as my daily supervisor! Emiel, thank you for 
your quick, clear and shrewd comments on the chapters and on the manuscripts, 
for your comforting words, your humorous remarks and for letting me know 
that I could call on you whenever I had questions. I could not have wished for a 
better supervisor! Juliette and Emiel, your supervision has enabled me to finish 
this dissertation successfully. I thank you both for believing in me.
112
Acknowledgements
I also would like to thank the promotion committee for their time and effort 
to appraise this dissertation and my colleagues, Emmelyn, Lieke, Marlies and 
Martijn, who have helped me with the final rehearsal of the defense.
Furthermore, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to 
those who have helped me with my studies. I am grateful to Richelle Portier for 
her help in collecting and processing the data for the diary study in Chapter 2. 
I also thank my colleagues Phoebe, Ted (Nie Hua), Yan (Gu), and Yu for their 
help in translating the questionnaires of the diary study into Chinese. I am also 
grateful to Shanook Jansen for collecting data for the experiment in Chapter 3. 
For my two studies on motives to forgive in Chapter 4 and 5, I received finan-
cial support from the Jo Kolk Foundation and from Study Abroad Fund from 
Tilburg University. Their financial support enabled me to conduct research on 
the Isle of Ambon in Indonesia and I am very grateful for that. In connection 
with this I also express my gratitude to Natalia Widiasari (Atma Jaya Catholic 
University of Indonesia) for providing me with workplace facilities. I am grate-
ful to Wilma Latuny, Lina Latuihamallo, and Lamtiur Tampubolon (Atma Jaya 
Catholic University of Indonesia) for their help in translating questionnaires into 
Indonesian and Ambonese. I also thank Lina Latuihamallo and Mendi Siregar 
for their help in collecting data. Special thanks go to my dear niece Dece Huwaë 
and her daughter Priscillia Jennifer for their warm care during my stay on the Isle 
of Ambon. In recruiting Dutch Moluccan participants for my study on emotion 
suppression and on forgiveness motives, I got the help of fellow Dutch Moluccans 
such as Darshana Satumalaij, Willem Huwaë, Alex Sohilait, and various personal 
and social Moluccan networks such as Perkumpulan Anak Anak Latuhalat Seilale 
and Hubungan Huwae, to which I am very grateful. I also express my gratitude to 
all the participants who have participated in my four studies.
It was a pleasure to have worked with colleagues from Tilburg Center for Cogni-
tion and Communication. Their friendly, relaxed and inviting personalities made 
my years at the department a place where I could feel at ease. Some colleagues I 
would like to mention in particular. Lauraine, I really enjoyed our weekly updates 
on current developments in various Moluccan communities across the country. 
When I came to the office for the first time, I was pleasantly surprised to be 
working with someone with whom I share the same personal and social networks 
and who I know already from the times when I was a member of the Moluccan 
community in Tilburg. And the fact that our mothers knew each other very well 
way back then makes our relationship very special. Yueqiao, Nanny and Asmir, 
it was delightful to share a room with you. I will miss our weekly lunches. We 
will keep in touch! Nanny, thanks for our talks on teaching, parenting and other 
everyday topics. Yueqiao, I enjoyed our weekly talks and our latest day trip in the 
113
Acknowledgements
park “De Hoge Veluwe”. Where shall we go to next time? Miriam, Phoebe, Tess, 
Yan (Xia), Yan (Gu), it was a pleasure to share a room with you. Wilma, I enjoyed 
our talks in Bahasa Ambon. Anke, thank you for your insightful comments on my 
grant applications. Alex, Jacqueline, Janneke, Karin, Kiek, Lieke, Mariek, Marije, 
Marjolijn, Martijn, Ruud, Veronique, Yan (Gu), Yu, thank you for your feedback 
and help when I was in need of one. Alain, Carel, Chrissy, Debby, Emmelyn, Eva, 
Fons, Ingrid, Katalin, Lieke, Leonoor, Marc, Maria, Marjet, Marlies, Martijn, 
Max, Nadine Naomi, Per, Peter, Rein and all the other colleagues, thank you for 
making my time at the department a pleasurable one.
And last but not least, I am grateful to Tonny Janssen for his ever so encouraging 
words and for putting things into perspective in stressful moments. Thank you for 
always being there for me and for thinking along with me. If you had not brought 
an opening at Stichting Palet to my attention, I probably would not have written 
this dissertation.






People can differ in how they respond to everyday situations. For example, when 
treated unfairly by someone, some people may express their anger and find it diffi-
cult to forgive the person who offended them. Others, however, may suppress this 
negative feeling and forgive the offender. People can also differ in their motives to 
forgive the offender. These variations in how people respond to the same situation 
can - at least in part - be explained by their cultural background. An often used 
framework to understand cross-cultural differences in how people feel, think and 
behave in social situations is that of individualism-collectivism (IC). Individualism 
involves cultures in which ties between individuals are relatively loose and the in-
terests of the individual often prevail over the interests of the group. Collectivism, 
by contrast, refers to cultures in which people are integrated into strong cohesive 
groups and the interests of the groups generally prevail over the interests of the 
individual. Yet, many researchers have challenged some of this framework’s prime 
assumptions and its usefulness as a universal model. This dissertation examined 
the usefulness of the IC-framework by examining how people from individualistic 
and collectivistic cultures regulate their emotions during social interactions and 
respond to transgressions in various settings with various people. For this, we used 
a combination of methods (daily diary, experiment, recall, scenario). Our samples 
included participants with more individualistic backgrounds (Dutch) and more 
collectivistic backgrounds (Chinese, Indonesian). We also conducted two studies 
with descendants from Indonesian immigrants (Moluccans) in the Netherlands. 
This dissertation showed that, even though participants from individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures differed in how they suppressed emotions and responded 
to transgressions, their responses also depended upon how close they were with 
those who were present or involved. We also found that personal concerns can 
be important too in collectivistic cultures and that in individualistic cultures 
relational concerns can also matter when forgiving someone. In addition, our 
findings showed that group interest did not prevail over personal interest among 
participants with collectivistic backgrounds following transgressions. As such, our 
findings present a nuanced view on characterizing cultures as either individual-
istic or collectivistic. More research is recommended to understand the interplay 
between individualistic and collectivistic values behind people’s responses to all 
kinds of situations with more and diverse samples. Furthermore, our findings with 
regard to the Moluccans in the Netherlands suggest that the longer immigrants 
with collectivistic backgrounds live in an individualistic society, the more their 
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